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III ABSTRACT 
 
This research examines trends in risk-disclosures in the annual reports of companies which 
have a primary listing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange [JSE].  A risk-disclosure 
checklist, based on the relevant academic and professional literature, was developed by the 
researcher and used to quantify changes in the frequency of risk-disclosures from 2010 to 
2012. The research also examines the extent to which information is integrated in the annual 
reports under review, identifying weaknesses for the attention of preparers and users of such 
reports. Results suggest that there has been an increase in the quantum of risk-disclosure 
and an increased awareness of the importance of complementing traditional financial 
reporting with a more comprehensive review of organisations’ key risks and their 
sustainability in the short-, medium- and long-term. In some cases, however, the added risk-
disclosure comes with repetition, the inclusion of generic risk information, and a lack of 
integration between risk-based disclosures and other key financial and non-financial metrics.  
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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Context of the research 
Recent corporate failures have led stakeholders to question the ability of the existing 
financial reporting system to provide relevant information for decision-making purposes. 
Financial information alone does not provide enough insight to form a comprehensive picture 
of the performance and ability of organisations to create and sustain value (Ramsden, 2010; 
Bansal et al, 2009; Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Bauer et al, 2004). The inability of organisations 
to anticipate and react to risk has been recognised as one of the main reasons for these 
corporate failures (International Integrated Reporting Committee of South Africa [IRC], 2011; 
Rossouw, 2005; Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; Abdo and Fisher, 2007). 
 
The emergence of integrated reporting is, in part, a reaction to this (IRC, 2011). Integrated 
reporting seeks to combine reporting of both financial and non-financial information in a way 
that promotes corporate strategy in a transparent manner, aiming to provide benefits to a 
range of stakeholders. It also includes a specific focus on the relevance of risk-management 
and the disclosure of information about an organisation’s risk profile to stakeholders 
(Rensburg and Botha, 2013).   
 
South Africa is regarded as leading the way in corporate governance and the integrated 
reporting initiative (Rensburg and Botha, 2013). The introduction of ‘The King Report on 
Governance for South Africa – 2009’ [King-III] (effective date March 2010) now requires 
companies listed on the JSE to integrate sustainability reporting into their financial reporting. 
(Institute of Directors, South Africa [IODSA], 2009) Integrated reporting is now required by 
listed companies within South Africa through King-III in an ‘apply or explain’ approach – 
King-III envisages an integrated report that provides accurate, reliable, credible financial and 
non-financial information to various stakeholders that will ensure short-term profitability and 
long-term sustainability  (Marx and van der Watt, 2011). 
 
King-III is a code of corporate policies and conduct which  looks beyond the corporation itself 
to its impact on the larger community, encouraging companies to be ‘good’ corporate 
citizens (Mammatt et al, 2009; Smith and Perks, 2010; Barrier, 2003). King-III defines 
integrated reporting as ‘the holistic and integrated representation of the company’s 
performance in terms of both its finances and its sustainability’. The integrated report links 
social, economic, environmental and social issues to strategy, ensuring that consequences 
of social and environmental behaviour are linked to financial outcomes. This allows 
disclosure of the inter-connectivity of governance and strategy to risks and opportunities, 
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and gives a holistic representation of a company’s performance in terms of finance and 
sustainability. This additional disclosure provides commercial, social and environmental 
context to the financial performance of a company, allowing stakeholders the ability to 
assess short-, medium- and long-term value creation, resulting in more informed decision-
making (IODSA, 2009; IODSA, 2010; Adams, 2012; Eccles and Saltzman, 2011; Ramsden, 
2010; E&Y, 2011; KPMG, 2011; E&Y, 2010; E&Y, 2011a; E&Y, 2011b). 
 
The ’Governance of Risk’ chapter in King-III places emphasis on risk-management and 
disclosure with the intention of assisting the Board of Directors [Board] to define roles and 
responsibilities for risk-management. More broadly, King-III  encourages the development of 
a ‘culture of risk-management’, a message iterated by the integrated reporting initiative 
(E&Y, 2009; IRC, 2011;  International Integrated Reporting Committee [IIRC], 2011; 
Coetsee, 2011; KPMG, 2012). This goes hand-in-hand with investors re-evaluating the role 
that corporate governance plays in their investment policies, incorporating corporate 
governance considerations into their valuations and investment decision-making (Bauer et 
al, 2004; Lamont, 2012)  
 
Integrated reporting provides a platform for strategic stakeholder communication.  In theory, 
it should provide stakeholders with relevant and material information, including the 
identification of material issues, the impacts of these issues and their relationship with the 
principle risks and opportunities. A risk profile can then be developed which protects 
stakeholder value and operates within the company’s internal and external boundaries, 
allowing performance to be measured and effectively communicated to stakeholders 
(Mammatt et al, 2009; Anand, 2010; IRC, 2011; Armbrester and Clay, 2011). 
 
1.2 Research question 
This research examines and investigates the trends in risk-disclosures of South African 
listed firms after the introduction of King-III. It explores emerging themes in organisations’ 
risk-disclosures and the practical application of the new governance of risk chapter, 
introduced in King-III within integrated reports.  
 
1.3 Purpose and relevance of the research 
Control and risk assessment have been prioritised as a key area for Boards with the 
realisation that they are accountable for the quality of risk processes within an organisation, 
as well as increased involvement regarding risk-management procedures (SpencerStuart, 
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2010). Risk-management is an essential part of corporate governance as it assists 
companies to identify threats and opportunities and to take action. Financial risk-
management is becoming more important as a result of globalisation, and as sources of risk 
increase within the business (Brezeanu and Al Essawi, 2011). As discussed in Section 1.2, 
risk-management and communication of risk-related issues to stakeholders are treated as 
key components of the corporate governance and integrated reporting agenda (IODSA, 
2009; IRC, 2011).  
 
As risk plays a central role in corporate governance, this study will explore the trends in risk-
disclosure of firms listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) post 2010. In doing so, 
it makes an important contribution to the prior literature by exploring the effects of the 
integrated reporting initiative on South African corporate disclosures which, to date, have not 
specifically examined trends and themes of risk-related disclosure. Obstacles to integrated 
reporting include: limited guidance, few published examples and uncertainty from potentially 
conflicting guidance (Rensburg and Botha, 2013). Although the Big Four audit firms are 
providing valuable guidance on how to compile an integrated report (for example, see E&Y, 
2009; E&Y, 2011; E&Y, 2011b; Matthews, 2011; KPMG, 2010; Deloitte, 2011; Armbrester 
and Clay, 2011), there is currently no enforced framework for preparing an integrated report, 
with the result that integrated reporting is still a work in progress1 (Eccles and Saltzman, 
2011; Ismail et.al, 2012). Preparers of integrated reports have been challenged by limited 
and only draft guidance, with tight reporting deadlines and limited examples of best practice 
to refer to. Both the local and international discussion papers provide principle-based 
guidance without a detailed framework of what is expected to be included in the report 
(Watson, 2012).  
 
During December 2013, the International Integrated Reporting Initiative released their 
framework for integrated reporting, containing guidance for organisations to produce true 
integrated reports. This document is principle-based and contains suggestions of what kind 
of information should be included in an integrated report to allow communication to 
stakeholders of short-, medium- and long-term value creation (IIRC, 2013). Having been only 
recently published, the framework has not yet been examined in detail and applied by 
preparers with the result that there are few practical examples of excellent integrated risk-
disclosures. The IIRC’s report is also largely consistent with the preceding discussion paper 
                                                 
1 The IIRC released a framework for integrated reporting during December 2013. The framework had not, 
however, been widely applied at the time of carrying out this research. Future research will, therefore, need to 
assess the impact of the framework on the preparation of integrated reports in South Africa and other 
jurisdictions.  
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(see IIRC, 2011) and does not give detailed guidance regarding risk-disclosures.  Therefore, 
understanding how companies are interpreting the requirements to prepare an integrated 
report, by analysing the disclosures found in the reports, will be of interest to both academics 
and practitioners wishing to understand how organisations are implementing the 
recommendations of King-III, the IRC and the IIRC. This is especially true when it comes to 
risk-related disclosure, given the importance of effective risk-management (Mammatt et al, 
2009; IRC, 2011; E&Y, 2011; Ramsden, 2010), as well as the progressive nature of 
integrated reporting, (E&Y, 2011b; Eccles and Saltzman, 2011; Rossouw, 2009; Matthews, 
2011). 
 
Finally, the research will also make an important contribution to corporate governance 
literature. South Africa is the first country in practical terms to mandate2 the preparation of an 
integrated report in an effort to improve the relevance and quality of corporate reporting. 
There has, however, been little research on the effect of integrated reporting on local 
companies (Solomon and Maroun, 2012). By providing a detailed account of how risk-
disclosures in the annual/integrated reports of South African listed companies is changing, 
this study will, therefore, answer important questions in academic research. The study is 
also the first to deal explicitly with an analysis of trends and patterns of risk-disclosure in a 
South African setting. 
 
1.4 Definition of terms 
‘Corporate governance’ – a control mechanism through which organisations are directed and 
regulated, allowing efficient operation of the corporation on behalf of the suppliers of capital, 
in order to ensure that an adequate return on their investment is paid. 
 
‘Risk-management’ - the set of processes that management use to identify, analyse and 
respond appropriately to risks that might adversely affect the realisation of the organisation’s 
business objectives. 
 
‘Average risk ratio’ – this is calculated as the number of times the word ‘risk’ is mentioned in 
the integrated report over the total number of pages in the report. 
 
                                                 
2 The JSE’s listing rules require companies to comply with King-III (and prepare an integrated report) or provide 
reasons for not doing so. Practically, the result is that the preparation of integrated reports is a de facto 
mandatory requirement.  
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‘Average risk-disclosure ratio’ – this is calculated as the average risk-disclosure score over 
the total number of pages in the report. 
 
‘Risk-disclosure score’ – the level of risk-disclosure in each set of annual/integrated reports 
over total available score per the risk-disclosure matrix (relative measure of risk). Refer to 
Section 3.4 for further detail. 
 
1.5 Limitations of the study 
Firstly, the scope of the study includes the analysis of companies with their primary listing3 
on the JSE which have consistently published annual/integrated reports between 1 March 
2010 and 31 March 2013. Due to inherent time and cost restrictions, the study did not 
examine all companies listed on the JSE and the final sample only included entities listed on 
the main board.  To retain the South African-specific focus of this study, risk-disclosure 
trends in other jurisdictions were not dealt with. In addition, the study excludes companies 
that are in the Financial Services industry segment due to the amount of very specific risk-
disclosure required by various regulations such as the Third Basel Accord [Basel III],  
 
Secondly, due to the restrictions on sample sizes and interpretive analysis of the data (see 
Section 3), findings may not be reproduced exactly and conclusions may not be 
generalisable. In particular, this study is limited to the largest number of companies per sub 
sector ranked in terms of their market capitalisation, and that they might not, therefore, 
necessarily be representative of the risk-disclosures of smaller listed companies, unlisted 
entities or public sector institutions. 
 
Finally, in order to limit the extent of subjectivity, no effort is made to gauge the quality of 
risk-disclosure. The research is concerned only with exploring trends and patterns of risk-
disclosures in a sample of integrated reports. An assumption is made that the total number 
of integrated reports analysed will be sufficient to gain adequate data on corporate financial 
reporting, and that the risk-disclosures are valid, accurate and complete.  
 
1.6 Report structure 
The structure of the remainder of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature, 
beginning with an analysis of both the Agency and Stakeholder Theories and the resultant 
                                                 
3 Only companies with a primary listing are subject to the requirements of King-III and the recommended 
preparation of integrated reports.  
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change in corporate governance systems. An analysis of the corporate failures and the 
relationship to corporate governance is then discussed, followed by a review of the corporate 
governance landscape in South Africa. The next section examines King-III and the 
importance of the integrated report. The chapter concludes by discussing the importance of 
risk-management as well as suggested disclosures in terms of risk governance, analysed as 
part of the literature. Chapter 3 details the research methodology used in this study, the 
research instrument and the data collection. Chapter 4 reviews the results from the data 
analysis, examining the overall risk-disclosure scores, the disclosures per theme, as well as 
using various statistical techniques to allow patterns and themes to emerge. Chapter 5 
contains the conclusion and recommendations for future research. Appendix A contains the 
research instrument used to compile the data for analysis. 
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CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Agency and stakeholder theory 
A widely documented problem throughout the literature relates to the separation between 
ownership and management within a company, which necessitates mechanisms to be put in 
place to monitor and control the performance of management by shareholders of the 
company (Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Rossouw et al, 2002; De Jong et al, 2005). Agency theory 
has its roots in the agency-principal relationship, which suggests that there is a contract 
between one party, namely the principal, and another party, the agent. In general terms, the 
principal engages the agent to perform services on their behalf, causing a delegation of 
authority. Suppliers of finance do not have full control over how the money that they invest is 
utilised and have very little influence in terms of any of the decision-making processes within 
the organisations that they invest in. The agency problem is essentially one of a conflict of 
interest, caused by separation in ownership and control and the resultant need for 
monitoring. Agency risk relates to the risk that management would act in their own self 
interest and take actions that deviate from firm value maximisation, creating a conflict of 
interest between management and shareholders, where management could engage in 
activities that are not in line with the objective of maximising shareholder wealth (Ramly, and 
Rashid, 2010; John and Senbet, 1998; Bhojraj and Partha, 2003; Dulewicz and Herbert, 
2004).  
 
Whilst agency theory suggests that corporations exist to maximise profits for shareholders, 
and that other stakeholders are considered only as far as they affect the strategic goals that 
affect shareholders, (Rossouw, 2005) stakeholder theory looks at the wider interests of 
society in general and acknowledges that there are many stakeholders who are affected by 
decisions and the nature of these relationships is very important. According to stakeholder 
theory, companies have a social responsibility that requires them to consider all interests of 
parties that are affected by their actions. It is important to make strategic decisions that 
encompass social responsibilities as there is a positive correlation between corporate social 
responsibility and financial performance. (Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Mariri and Chipunza, 
2011; Braxton, 2010). The evolution from agency to stakeholder theory, therefore, has 
important implications for corporate governance systems. 
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2.2 The role of corporate governance 
2.2.1 The influence of stakeholder theory on corporate governance 
Corporate governance is a control mechanism through which organisations are directed and 
regulated, allowing efficient operation of the corporation on behalf of the suppliers of capital, 
in order to ensure that an adequate return on their investment is received. Corporate 
governance standards are standards that set commonly accepted patterns of corporate 
behaviour and are used as a means to improve management quality in economic entities. 
They represent a practical way to give management the freedom to achieve the company 
objectives in an efficient, effective and transparent manner. Simplistically speaking, the 
manager raises funds from investors and then utilises these funds to conduct business and 
make a profit. The financier, therefore, requires the expertise of the manager to generate 
returns but must ensure that the manager utilises the resources efficiently and effectively. 
The abuse of the control function by management is to the detriment of the owners, and this 
forms the basis of corporate governance, which reduces this potential conflict of interest 
through effective monitoring, reducing expropriation and misallocation of funds, increasing 
productivity and providing management with a long-term planning horizon (Rossouw et al, 
2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bhojraj and Partha, 2003; Thlon, 2011). 
 
Corporate governance controls the relationship between the Board, shareholders and 
management to ensure the resolution of agency conflicts. Corporate governance specifies 
the rules of business decision-making within a company with an aim to protect investors and 
allow them to realise an appropriate return whilst also allowing organisations to pledge to 
stakeholders that they are committed to being honest and fair in all business practices, and 
that they are fully transparent and accountable. (Gill, 2012; Thlon, 2011; John and Senbet, 
1998) 
 
Post-Enron, there has been a shift in corporate governance from the traditional focus on 
agency conflict to one that seeks to protect not only investors but also stakeholders. 
Previously, the focus was on using corporate governance as a mechanism to allow 
shareholders to trust management with safeguarding their investments, ensuring value 
maximisation for shareholders but excluding certain stakeholder interests, as well as 
overlooking the environmental and social impacts of corporate conduct, leading to 
management making decisions which were shareholder-centric and which protected only 
shareholder interests. Corporate governance now addresses many issues relating to ethics, 
accountability, transparency and disclosure, including corporate social responsibility, which 
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uses corporate governance as a vehicle for incorporating social and environmental concerns 
into business decision making processes. (Gill, 2012; Thlon, 2011)  
 
Corporate governance represents a long-term view that integrates environmental and social 
responsibilities in analysing risks, discovering opportunities and allocating capital in the best 
interest of the shareholder. By ensuring that appropriate corporate policies and procedures 
are well-defined, communicated and understood, operational governance programmes can 
improve decision-making, joining stakeholders together in a business-driven collaboration 
that creates an enterprise that is strong and focussed on the future (Mariri and Chipunza, 
2011; Lamont, 2012). Trust in corporations is on the decline, with the expectation that the 
adherence to good corporate governance practices and principles will turn the tide of low 
trust in corporations and their leaders. (Rossouw, 2009; Bansal et al, 2009) 
 
2.2.2 Corporate governance in South Africa 
South Africa is one of the largest and most developed economies in Africa.. One of the 
reasons for this relates to the leadership that South Africa has exhibited in corporate 
governance, although the country has its own unique characteristics – including a high crime 
rate, sluggish economy and a great deal of political instability. A relatively high quality of 
corporate governance is especially important in a developing market where foreign capital 
investment is essential for the growth of companies. Corporate governance mechanisms in 
South Africa were borne from market pressures and are pivotal to the success and 
revitalisation of capital markets and prospects for the economy (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; 
Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Malherbe and Segal, 2001). 
 
South Africa is a pioneer and has always been in the forefront of corporate governance 
standards and disclosures, leading the way in environmental, social and governance 
disclosures and, therefore, attracting international investors’ attention (Mans-Kemp et al, 
2012). Key reform initiatives were developed in South Africa and during 1992, a crucial time 
in South Africa’s history before the first independent democratic election, former South 
African Supreme Court Judge, Mervyn King, was approached to chair a private sector body 
to formulate South Africa’s first corporate governance guidelines. The first draft of the King 
Code, issued in 1994, led the way in international corporate governance, promoting the 
highest standard of corporate governance in South Africa by advocating an integrated 
approach to governance that is in the interest of a wide range of stakeholders, and dictates a 
minimum standard through a principle-based approach. This inclusive approach has been 
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fundamental to the long term corporate successes in South Africa (Vaughn and Ryan, 2006; 
Rossouw et al, 2002).  
 
Developing or transitioning economies have additional challenges to face when 
implementing corporate governance, including control structures, weak judicial and legal 
systems, under developed institutional investors, as well as limited financial and human 
resources. In South Africa this becomes even further complicated by specific domestic 
issues that require special attention, including cultural differences, the incidence of 
HIV/AIDS, environmental issues relating to mining, as well as unionised labour issues and 
Black Economic Equity (BEE) issues. South Africa-specific factors also include a high level 
of poverty and unemployment and significantly skewed income distribution. South Africa has 
a unique socio-political context that requires careful navigation and balance (Vaughn and 
Ryan, 2006; Kakabadse et al, 2002).  
 
In a South African context when compared to global corporate governance, there are a 
number of developmental initiatives that the government has put in place (for example, 
Health and Safety, BEE) and businesses are called to play a more active role in society 
(Mariri and Chipunza, 2011). The King report institutionalised corporate governance and 
ethics by instilling an integrated, inclusive approach to good governance that is in the 
interest of a wide range of stakeholders and relies on the fundamental principles of good 
financial, social, ethical and environmental practices. (Nkomo, 2003)  
 
The King report was first issued in 1994 under the mandate of including specific South 
African corporate governance issues into one code. This was then revised into King-II as a 
result of the changes in laws and accounting standards and reissued in 2002. King-III was 
subsequently released by the IODSA in September 2009 as a result of a number of factors.  
Firstly, changes in legislation necessitated a revisit of King-II, including the new Companies 
Act as well as other stringent legislation changes. Secondly, there were a number of 
changes in global corporate governance standards, and finally the expectations of 
stakeholders shifted (E&Y, 2010). Previously, this code was voluntary but the King-III 
revision has made integrated reporting compulsory for JSE listed firms through the JSE 
listing rules, although the provisions in King-III are through an ‘apply or explain’ approach 
(Mans-Kemp et al, 2012).  
 
King-III suggests suitable and effective frameworks to be put in place that ethically respond 
to and help to navigate decision-making strategies for sustainable development and 
transformation in South Africa. The purpose of King-III is to promote the highest standards of 
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governance within South Africa, looking beyond the financial and regulatory aspects to 
include the social, ethical and environmental best practice in South African firms and instill 
triple-bottom-line reporting that has a wide and broad based inclusive approach, placing 
social responsibility at the forefront of the corporate governance agenda (SpencerStuart, 
2009). This integrated approach presents a dynamic vision to reporting, with disclosure 
being of fundamental importance. Significant events, both positive and negative, that could 
have an impact on a company’s share price should be disclosed because investors require 
not only financial information but information that they can draw conclusions from as to the 
sustainability of the company (Barrier, 2003). Focus has shifted from profits for shareholders 
alone to the recognition that business has a responsibility to those that give it licence to 
operate – its stakeholders. Doing business in an ethical manner results in respect and 
support of all parties with which the company interacts and also contributes to profitability. 
King-III envisages an integrated report that provides accurate, reliable, credible financial and 
non-financial information to various stakeholders that will ensure short-term profitability and 
long-term sustainability (Mammatt et al, 2009; Smith and Perks, 2010). 
 
2.3 The changing face of corporate governance 
2.3.1 Corporate failures 
During 2008, the global financial crisis revealed a level of naivety regarding governance, 
regulators and Boards with regard to their responsibilities relating to overseeing firms that 
were considered to be ‘too big to fail’, and revealed certain blatant failures of corporate 
governance codes and risk-management practices. A number of famous corporate failures 
have occurred over the past decade, including Enron, Worldcom, Parmalat, Maxwell, and 
Daewoo, to name a few internationally. South Africa has not been immune to these 
disasters, with Regal Bank and Leisurenet ranking amongst the list of local corporate 
failures, demonstrating the growing need for transparency within corporate reporting. These 
failures have highlighted the importance of corporate governance with both shareholders 
and the public becoming more concerned regarding how companies are governed as a 
result of the growing number of corporate scandals, as well as concerns for the sustainability 
of the environment and globalisation of economies (Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Coetzee and 
Lubbe, 2013; Turnbull, 2010; Ntim et al, 2013). 
 
Corporate governance has attracted public attention as a result of both the successes and 
failures of large corporations. Problems have ranged from collapse of stock markets, 
dubious accounting practices, abuse of corporate power to criminal investigations, as well as 
19 
 
specific corporate governance failures such as agency problems, conflict of interest, 
inexperienced directors, and unequal share rights. Recent societal trends and events, 
including the global financial crisis, persistent socio-economic inequality, resource 
constraints and climate change to name but a few, have resulted in an increasing level of 
turbulence and uncertainty with corporate governance coming into the limelight (IRC, 2011; 
Roussow, 2002; Kakabadse et al, 2002; Alhaji and Fauziah, 2012; Rossouw, 2005).  
 
The collapse of companies during the global financial crisis have led stakeholders to 
question the ability of the existing financial reporting system to provide relevant information 
for decision-making as current reporting focuses mainly on historical information and does 
not give sufficient attention to the future prospects of the company, and also does not 
adequately address financial risks, despite the length and complexity of reporting 
requirements. In addition, the volume of natural and labour-related incidents have 
highlighted the broad spectrum of risks that can threaten the sustainability of a business, 
leaving investors with inadequate information in order to make assessments of how the 
company has considered and addressed its sustainability. It has become clear that financial 
measurements alone cannot provide sufficient insight (Bansal et al, 2009; IRC, 2011; 
Ramsden, 2010; Watson, 2012).These corporate scandals have, however, acted as an 
influence for change, partially as a result of a decrease in shareholder confidence, as well as 
the effect that this has on undermining the level of investment, both local and foreign. 
Although the bottom line is important, the overall transparency, accountability and fairness to 
all stakeholders are vital factors in building a level of trust with stakeholders (Kakabadse et 
al, 2002).  
 
The McKinsey Investor Opinion Survey of 2002 (McKinsey & Company, 2002) shows that 
corporate governance represents a huge concern to investors in emerging markets, and that 
investors pay attention to corporate governance disclosures, impacting on valuations of 
companies. When making an investment decision between companies with similar financial 
performance, the survey showed that investors will pay a premium of between 23 and 28 
percent for a company that demonstrates good corporate governance. This indicates that 
shareholders value corporate governance and consider it when making investment 
decisions, and are willing to pay more for shares from a company with good corporate 
governance when compared to a company that is poorly run with the same financial 
performance. In this Survey, the Board’s practices are considered to be at least as important 
as the financial information, and shareholders indicated that they would pay more for shares 
in a well governed company (Rossouw, et al, 2002; Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Vaughn and 
Ryan, 2006; Kakabadse et al, 2002). This is a clear indication that companies need to give 
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the correct level of attention to corporate governance as it is an important indicator of 
economic stability and the growth prospects of the company. The financial crisis further 
underscored the importance of risk-management in pursuance of business strategy, and 
operational crises over the last few years have raised concerns regarding the effectiveness 
of the supervision and execution of controls and the need to implement the right level of 
control to manage operational risk and maximise performance within legal boundaries and 
the risk threshold. This requires a strong operational risk methodology that defines the risk 
profile and an underlying developed understanding of the business processes and 
operations (Abdo and Fisher, 2007; Lamont, 2012; Ladd, 2010; Ntim et al, 2013). 
 
King-III has placed an emphasis on the duties and responsibilities of the Board in relation to 
their monitoring abilities (IODSA, 2009). As mentioned previously, Boards in South Africa 
face greater complexity and are increasingly in the spotlight as the pressure to enhance 
corporate governance standards mounts. There is a continuous move towards transparency 
and accountability for the impact on the community that firms cannot ignore. The Board, 
shareowners and regulators have shifted their focus to risk oversight and risk governance 
(SpencerStuart, 2009; Davis and Lulomnik, 2011). The integrated report is a means of 
communication which provides investors with information that is required to evaluate and 
assess sustainability and the long-term viability of an organisation (IODSA, 2010).  
 
2.3.2 Integrated reporting and King-III 
King-III encourages integrated reporting because governance, strategy and sustainability are 
seen to be inseparable and are inextricably linked to an organisation’s success. Integrated 
reporting offers a unique opportunity to centre business reporting on strategy and creation of 
value, i.e. how a business is using the capital invested by shareholders (Matthews, 2011; 
IRC, 2011; IODSA, 2010; Adams, 2012; Eccles and Saltzman, 2011). The IIRC defines an 
integrated report as ‘a concise communication about how an organisation’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects, in the context of its external environment, lead to 
the creation of value over the short, medium and long term’. Emphasis is placed on the 
connectivity of information that allows a full picture of performance and sustainability to be 
conveyed to stakeholders (IIRC, 2013; IODSA, 2009; Watson, 2012). King-III suggests listed 
companies in South Africa issue an integrated report that allows an integrated representation 
of a company’s performance in terms of both finance and sustainability, and reports on 
aspects that are essential to any company’s success, including strategy, corporate 
governance, effective risk-management processes, financial performance and overall 
sustainability reporting. This allows the company to express relationships amongst these 
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items and provides a connection between the various concepts that give stakeholders the 
ability to assess short-, medium- and long-term value creation and sustainability and make 
more informed decisions (IODSA, 2009; KPMG, 2011; E&Y, 2011; E&Y, 2010; IRC, 2011; 
E&Y, 2011a; E&Y, 2011b; E&Y, 2009; Ramsden, 2010).  
 
Integrated reporting creates a formal communication and allows the assessment of the 
organisation’s future viability against not only historical financial information, but also 
forward-looking environmental, social and governance criteria. This is important because a 
company does not act in isolation and its success is reliant on society, the environment and 
the global economy. It also allows executives to develop a better understanding of what 
drives the company and what the risks and opportunities are (E&Y, 2011b). The integrated 
report is the outcome of business strategy and reporting of management processes, one of 
the key principles being combining disclosure on strategy, risk, performance and 
sustainability. The integrated report links social, economic, environmental and social issues 
to strategy, forcing the link between consequences of social and environmental behaviour to 
financial outcomes. King-III refers to integrated reporting as more than just the combination 
of the annual report and sustainability report – it allows organisations to integrate 
sustainability into the day-to-day business strategy and operations and results in a holistic 
process, resulting in a report that not only explains how sustainability is connected to the 
organisation’s strategy but also how sustainability performance, risk and targets are 
measured and monitored. In order to be effective, integrated reporting needs to be simple, 
meaningful, readable and relevant to an ever widening range of stakeholders, meeting their 
needs and is intended to be the primary means of communication to stakeholders. (E&Y, 
2011b; E&Y, 2009; IRC, 2011; Ramsden, 2010; KPMG, 2011; E&Y, 2011; E&Y, 2010; E&Y, 
2011a). 
  
A survey was conducted by Ernst & Young in 2011 to obtain current market views on the 
values, challenges, content and process of integrated reporting, with 25 companies on the 
JSE across a range of sectors participating. The current market view as per the survey 
results shows that the main value perceived by the market is that it will focus companies on 
material issues and impacts that are relevant to stakeholders. One of the key items raised in 
the survey related to perceptions of internal benefits including the redefining of and 
refocusing on strategy, improved definition and collection of key performance indicator data, 
improvement of stakeholder interactions, the need to report on future sustainability as well 
as to improve risk-management and identify and capitalise on opportunities and efficiency 
improvements (E&Y, 2011). 
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Integrated reporting creates the link between governance and strategy to risks. Processes 
need to be developed which enable monitoring and analysis, stakeholder engagement, 
setting targets and acceptable deviations from these targets (IRC, 2011; Ramsden, 2010). 
Integrated reporting enhances risk-management because risks can be considered from an 
integrated perspective, encouraging innovation and giving the organisation a competitive 
edge as new opportunities identified are exploited and provide a platform for strategic 
stakeholder communication. The benefits of integrating include the viewing, weighting and 
prioritising of stakeholder concerns, as well as organisational values being clarified and the 
goals and objectives being developed to align with core values. The information presented 
should include identification of material issues, impacts and relationships and any related 
risks and opportunities for current and future activities. The process followed should also be 
documented within the integrated report used to identify and address concerns. A risk profile 
should be developed that protects stakeholder value and operates within the companies’ 
internal and external boundaries, allowing performance to be measured and effectively 
communicated to stakeholders. This allows a meaningful roadmap with both short-term and 
long-term strategies that rely on benchmarks to measure success (Mammatt et al, 2009; 
Anand, 2010; IRC, 2011; Armbrester and Clay, 2011). 
 
2.3 Risk governance  
2.3.1 The importance of risk-management 
As mentioned previously, the Board is an important internal control mechanism in the 
corporate governance process, being ultimately responsible for the long-term health and 
survival of the corporations, and plays an important monitoring role as they are the primary 
means for shareholders to exercise control over top management. As a result of the Board’s 
understanding of the fundamental issues within the company, they are responsible for 
informing and approving the goals of the organisation and the direction of the strategy being 
employed to achieve those goals, whilst taking into account ethical considerations in each 
decision made. The Board enables the company to create value within given constraints, 
challenges, resources and the external environment in which it operates (Naidoo, 2011; 
John and Senbet, 1998; IRC, 2011; IODSA, 2009; Daily and Dalton, 1994). Boards are 
responsible for overseeing the business strategy, a key element being the identification of 
potential threats, as well as opportunities to ensure that organisations remain dynamic. Part 
of the Board’s responsibility is to consider the validity of decisions and to evaluate the merit 
of planned business actions. Boards are also key in overseeing risk-management, and, 
recently, have been conducting more in-depth views of risk that are much broader in scope 
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and influenced by real life scenarios, including health and safety, environmental concerns, IT 
development, security, industrial relations as well as the corporate reputation, to name but a 
few. They are responsible for assessing the impact of these risks and ensuring that the level 
of risk taken remains within the norms and risk appetite of the firm (Jensen, 2001; Hauswirth 
et al, 2012). 
 
Control and risk assessment has been prioritised as a key focus area for most Boards with 
the realisation that they are accountable for the quality of risk processes within an 
organisation, as well as increased involvement regarding risk-management procedures 
(SpencerStuart, 2010). Risk-management can be defined as the set of processes which 
management use to identify, analyse and respond appropriately to risks that might adversely 
affect the realisation of the organisation’s business objectives. Risk-management includes 
the development of a risk-management framework and appropriate structures, processes 
and systems established by management that will ensure that the risk philosophy is 
incorporated into the daily tasks and activities of the organisation. Risk-management is a 
systematic process followed within an organisation that allows identification, assessment 
and management of risks at both a strategic and operational level. Further, risk-management 
relates to monitoring and responding to events that could adversely affect the organisation 
(Anand, 2010; Jubb, 2011; Coetzee and Lubbe, 2013).  
 
Risk reporting is an essential component of integrated reporting, and all risks that are critical 
to the business should be disclosed. Currently, the general trend is that only risks which  are 
controlled by financial instruments are being discussed, leaving an incomplete picture of all 
risks and the management thereof. Shareholders want to know how environmental, social 
and governance issues have impacted on the scope of the business to operate and 
generate profits, and how these issues and risks have been managed and the impact on 
value and sustainability (Bray, 2011).  
 
An integrated risk-management approach functions through the co-ordination and 
identification of multiple sources of risk inside the company using a continuous process that 
permeates all processes of company activities and focuses on employees on every level. 
The risk-management processes should be integrated into the business, and include 
identification, analysis, mitigation, monitoring and reporting of risk, including risk evaluation 
and quantification if practicable. This requires effort to be co-ordinated and well planned, 
with a proper risk-management policy defined, as well as levels of risk tolerance to allow 
calculated risks to be taken. This should also be regularly reviewed, and the monitoring and 
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evaluation of risk-management processes should determine whether the company is on 
track to meet its objectives (Bhimani, 2009; Sarens et al., 2009, IODSA, 2009). 
 
A shared understanding of risk-management and standardised risk processes is essential 
within the organisation. Risks need to be measured as inherent risk, residual risk, velocity of 
the risk and any external factors that influence the risk. The company should identify key 
risks that are both repeatable and measurable and set a risk appetite that defines the level of 
risk that the company is willing to tolerate to ensure that it meets its business strategy. Risk 
appetite is the level of enterprise-wide risk that leaders are willing to take in pursuit of 
strategy, acquisitions, new products and market expansions, and are usually defined as a 
monetary amount or key ratio/percentage. This risk appetite is important at both the entity-
wide level and the business unit level and it is equally as important to have a defined link 
between strategic direction and the ultimate level of risk that management and Board are 
willing to accept. All risks need to be considered – including financial, operational, 
compliance and reputational risks. There needs to be a culture of risk-management 
embedded into the policies and procedures at all levels and all employees should consider 
risk in the performance of their jobs. Risk tolerance can be said to represent the union of 
strategic objectives and risk assessment (Lamont, 2012).  
 
Risk-management allows identification of, not only threats, but also opportunities and uses 
substance over form to represent these risks to shareholders. The IASB issued guidelines 
on issues that management should consider when presenting commentary in support of their 
financial information that includes key trends, factors, risks, strategies and the effectiveness 
thereof in order to supplement and complement the financial information (IASB, 2010). 
Compliance with risk-management and regulations is a vital element for any business to 
protect its reputation and build a competitive and sustainable brand. Risk-management and 
understanding key risk factors allows the business to take affordable, acceptable and 
business advantageous risks by a well informed Board. The fast pace and complexity of 
modern business makes corporate governance essential for survival, and the fact that the 
company is seen to be in good hands leads to external investment, good employees, 
positive media relations and more business from clients (Peacey and Cooper, 2012). 
 
Management suggests strategies that seem sound, but the Board need to analyse and 
contextualise these strategies in terms of industry trends, the company’s internal risk 
appetite, as well as what is best for long-term shareholder value. The Board discuss risks 
that are deemed to be the most material, to which the company is most vulnerable and that 
have serious potential impact on the organisation. The Board is tasked to examine and 
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debate key risks and opportunities that could hinder achievement of strategic goals and will 
allow wealth to be created on a sustainable basis. The external environment is never static 
and therefore it is important that the Board adapt the mission, vision and strategy of the 
business, and never underestimate the power of the future (Sheehan, 2011; Ramsden, 
2010).  
 
A clear link between strategy, action and value needs to be made so that the information gap 
that leads investors to price in risks that are adequately managed can be closed. There is a 
positive correlation between company value and financial risk-management and, therefore, it 
is important for the financial management of an organisation to enhance risk mitigation 
techniques that support wealth accumulation, and give the necessary attention to risk-
management. Global companies are becoming more accountable to multiple stakeholders, 
and risk governance assists organisations with the process of protecting shareholder value 
whilst increasing bottom line accountability (Hoffman, 2011; Brezeanu and Al Essawi, 2011; 
Demidenko and McNutt, 2010). 
 
A process to be followed suggested by the IODSA (2010) is the integration of the business 
strategy to governance and sustainability, including the identification of significant and 
material issues as well as defining this identification process. In addition, key performance 
indicators (KPI’s), actions and intended outcomes should be formulated for each risk and 
progress reported to the Board as frequently as considered necessary, depending on the 
materiality of the risk. The relationship between the risks should be identified and any impact 
on revenue, expenses, investments, cash-flows or operational performance measures 
should be quantified accordingly. Management incentives should be aligned with the 
continuous measurement of applicable KPI’s (IODSA, 2010).  
 
Coetzee and Lubbe (2013) analyse the concept of assessing risk maturity in South Africa by 
utilising a risk maturity scorecard in order to assess how comprehensive the risk-
management strategy is within organisations. Although risk-management is a fairly new 
concept for organisations, the evolution of corporate governance has identified formalised 
risk-management frameworks as an effective way to assist management with their 
responsibilities in terms of risk governance. It is important to note that acceptance of a level 
of risk is essential to ensure that there are adequate opportunities for organisations to grow 
profitably. Risk-management is unique to each organisation and it is at the discretion of each 
organisation what quality and quantity of activities should be implemented to manage risks – 
this is referred to as the risk maturity of an organisation (Coetzee and Lubbe, 2013). 
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A study examining whether the quality of firm level corporate governance has any effect on 
the quality and extent of corporate risk-disclosures in South Africa was conducted during 
2013 by Ntim et al. Results of this study show evidence of a general increase in the 
corporate risk-disclosure level throughout the period analysed and indicate that corporate 
risk-disclosures have not converged and are still not similar among the companies 
investigated (Ntim et al, 2013). 
 
2.3.2 Requirements of risk-management reporting in terms of King-III 
As mentioned previously, integrated reporting contextualises financial results by looking at 
the positive and negative impacts surrounding those results and how the company will 
enhance the positives and eliminate or reduce the negatives (IODSA, 2010). King-II 
suggested that risk-management processes were to be assessed at least annually, but King-
III has taken this one step further and wants assurance to be given on the effectiveness of 
risk-management and a comment to be made on the level of risk maturity.  Risk-
management is essential for any organisation, not only because it is a central component of 
corporate governance and required by both King-III and the Companies Act, but also 
because the link between risk and strategy cannot be separated. An entirely new chapter 
has been included in King-III that deals specifically with risk-management, entitled 
‘Governance of Risk’. The new King-III principles for risk are intended to assist the Board to 
focus on defining roles and responsibilities for risk-management, and to encourage inclusive 
risk-management approach within organisations. Therefore organisations are encouraged 
through King-III principles to consider risks within a defined risk framework (E&Y, 2010; 
Coetsee, 2011; KPMG, 2012).  
 
KPMG suggests a number of directives regarding the Board’s responsibility for risk 
governance and practical steps, in its publication entitled Toolkit for the Company Director. 
Risk is described as a fundamental part of business that cannot be avoided, and so must be 
managed – the key is to balance the risk taken between with the rewards earned (KPMG, 
2012). It is vital that proper risk frameworks are developed in order to mitigate key risks. The 
Board should identify risks and opportunities in every area including human, social, 
environmental, manufacturing and economic capital and analyse each resource that is 
required to run the company that could pose a threat to success, and actively manage each 
risk according to the threat or opportunity it materially poses (Coetzee and Lubbe, 2013; 
IODSA, 2010).  
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According to research, currently not all firms are adhering to all elements in King-III with 
regard to risk-management and, therefore, development of future applicable and 
comprehensive guidelines and legislation is important to enhance application (Coetzee and 
Lubbe, 2013). The International Integrated Reporting Initiative released their framework for 
integrated reporting in December 2013 – a principle-based document containing guidance 
for organisations to produce true integrated reports. The framework references that the focus 
of integrated reporting is to explain to stakeholders (specifically those providing financial 
capital) how an organisation creates value over time, referencing interdependencies and 
strategies essential in the ability of an organisation to create value over the short, medium 
and long term. This ability to create value for the organisation is inextricably linked to the 
value that it creates for others, hence the need to report in an integrated manner (IIRC, 
2013). 
 
Within the framework for integrated reporting released by the IIRC, information considered to 
be useful to stakeholders when assessing the organisation’s ability to create value were 
identified. Specifically, the IIRC lists risks and opportunities as a content element, stating 
that the integrated report should answer the question ‘What are the specific risks and 
opportunities that affect the organisation’s ability to create value over the short, medium and 
long term, and how is the organisation dealing with them?’ A number of items were 
mentioned that could be disclosed to answer this question. Examples include the 
identification of the specific sources of risks and opportunities, as well as the assessment of 
the probability, magnitude and mitigation steps relating to each risk and opportunity. 
Identification of associate strategic objectives, strategies, policies, targets and key 
performance indicators are also suggested (IIRC, 2013). 
 
The risk chapter within King-III, as well as the disclosures referred to in the prior literature 
above, is the focus of this exploratory research. To this end, the suggested disclosures in the 
literature have been grouped into a number of themes by the researcher as documented 
below (This process is further explained in more detail in Section 3).  
 
Overall Risk-disclosures 
There are a number of key requirements within the Governance of Risk chapter, including 
the overall responsibility of the Board to govern and report on risk within the organisation, 
with an appreciation that strategy, risk, performance and sustainability are inseparable 
(KPMG, 2009). 
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Further, it is the responsibility of the Board to acknowledge that performance, strategy, 
sustainability and risk are inseparable, and that the development of an integrated risk-
management framework is essential in the implementation of King-III. The Board is also 
responsible for approving a documented risk policy and management plan that is 
appropriate, and distributing this widely throughout the organisation to all employees, 
establishing the risk strategy in the culture of the organisation. The Board should then 
disclose its view on the effectiveness of the risk-management process and any unusual 
risks. It is also the Board’s responsibility to ensure that there is a framework developed to 
help to anticipate unpredictable risks. (E&Y, 2010; E&Y, 2009a; KPMG, 2011; KPMG, 2009; 
KPMG, 2012) 
 
Risk-management Policy and Plan 
The responsibilities relating to the risk-management policy include the design, 
implementation and monitoring of the risk-management plans in order to give the Board 
assurance regarding the effectiveness of the risk-management process. The Board is 
responsible for the approval of a formal risk policy and management plan that is appropriate. 
The risk-management plan should aim to bring the organisation to its desired level of risk 
maturity, reflecting what needs to be improved and the timelines for these improvements. 
The goal of the risk-management plan is to establish an awareness of risk within the 
organisation and ensure that risk is being managed in an appropriate manner on a day-to-
day basis. The Board is responsible for ensuring frameworks and methodologies are 
implemented to improve the probability of anticipating unpredictable risks (E&Y, 2010; E&Y, 
2011; E&Y, 2009a; KPMG, 2011; KPMG, 2009; KPMG, 2012; PWC, 2009; Coetzee and 
Lubbe, 2013). 
 
Delegation of Risk Responsibilities 
King-III suggests that the risk-related responsibilities should be specified within the Board 
charter and terms of reference, and that the Board should be able to demonstrate that it has 
dealt with the governance of risk comprehensively and satisfied itself that risk assessments, 
responses and interventions are effective (KPMG, 2009; KPMG, 2012). 
 
The Board can be assisted in carrying out their risk responsibilities, and can delegate the 
execution of the risk-management either to management, a Chief Risk Officer, the Audit 
Committee or a specific Risk Committee with defined responsibilities to assist in embedding 
risk-management the day-to-day running of the business (E&Y, 2010; E&Y, 2009a; PWC, 
2009; KPMG, 2009). 
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King-III suggests that internal audit should follow a risk-based approach, and the internal 
audit planning should include an assessment of risks and opportunities facing the 
organisation, aligning with the risk assessment process whilst considering the risk maturity of 
the organisation itself. The Board is also responsible for ensuring that there is an effective 
risk-based internal audit function. An integral part of risk-management relates to the function 
that the audit committee fulfils, with an overview of financial reporting risks, internal financial 
controls, fraud and IT risks relative to reporting. The Board should receive assurance from 
both management regarding the effectiveness of risk-management, as well as a written 
assessment from internal audit of both the internal controls and risk-management (KPMG, 
2009; PWC, 2009; KPMG, 2012). 
 
Currently, Boards are divided over whether to form a specialist risk committee or include 
risk-management as a responsibility of the audit committee, with the debate centred on the 
omission of risks by either committee (SpencerStuart, 2010). King-III refers to the decision to 
delegate being based on a number of factors. The Audit Committee should have an in-depth 
understanding of the significant actual and potential financial and non-financial risks that 
affect the integrated report and ensure that they are adequately addressed in terms of 
financial reporting, including the evaluation of the Internal Audit function. The Internal Audit 
function will then in turn evaluate the efficiency of the Audit Committee, as well as the risk-
management policies and processes. King-III suggests that a risk committee should be 
appointed by the Board, with a minimum of three members and can consist of executive and 
non-executive directors, as well as senior management and independent risk experts and 
should meet at least twice a year. The Board is responsible for evaluating the performance 
of this committee. (E&Y, 2011; KPMG, 2009) 
 
Risk Tolerance Levels 
When considering strategic risk, excessive risk aversion is not synonymous with creation of 
longer term value, and this is the reason why when approving the risk-management policy 
for the organisation, it is vital to define the level of risk tolerance considered to be 
acceptable, and setting the risk appetite of the organisation. A risk and control framework 
should be developed against which risk assessments can be conducted, including the 
setting of boundaries of how much risk the organisation and its business units should be 
prepared to accept in operations, facilitating management’s ability to set a proportional 
response to risk in the context of business objectives. This assists management in 
considering how much risk is appropriate. Both risk practice (defined as the policy, 
guidelines and procedures) and risk tolerance should be aligned to ensure the proper 
evaluation of risk-management and control activities set in consideration to the risk appetite 
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to determine boundaries of acceptable risk-management and performance (KPMG, 2012; 
E&Y, 2011). King-III defines risk appetite as the level of risk that executive management or 
the Board is willing to accept on an aggregate basis in respect to strategic and business 
objectives. Each risk should be aligned with its impact and likelihood ratings to determine 
how significant the risk is and whether the organisation is able to accept the risk. (E&Y, 
2011) 
 
Risk Assessment 
The Board is responsible for determining the level of risk tolerance, ensuring that risk 
assessments are carried out on a continual basis (at least annually) with each risk-
management policy, practice, procedure, strategy or program including an element of risk 
assessment, with limits and thresholds being put in place (E&Y, 2009a; IODSA, 2010). King-
III requires that there is formal risk assessment – it envisages a continuous monitoring of the 
entity’s risk profile rather than a once-off annual assessment. A well-structured and 
systematic process is crucial as any risk not identified cannot be managed. The first 
important step is to identify the organisation’s strategic objectives and map these strategies 
as they are intended to be used as each strategy will expose the organisation to a different 
type of risk. The process of risk identification should be divorced from quantification of 
potential effect on the company or likelihood of materialising at the initial stage to prevent 
risks from being automatically de-prioritised. The Board’s responsibility includes the review 
of the company’s risk register with risks quantified where possible, and to ensure that 
management implements appropriate risk-management responses and these responses are 
monitored. Both inherent and residual risks should be viewed in order to prioritise and direct 
resources to the correct risk (E&Y, 2011; KPMG, 2009; KPMG, 2012). 
 
Monitoring of risk-management 
The Board is responsible for ensuring that management consider and implement appropriate 
risk responses and continually monitor risk. Monitoring should occur as frequently as 
required by the risk itself and be reported to the Board along with the metrics that have 
exceeded the baseline. Risk indicators should also be identified and monitored for significant 
changes and events which effect the risk profile and the environment in which the 
organisation operates (KPMG, 2012; IODSA, 2010). 
 
Key Risk-disclosures 
Deloitte and Touche (2008) suggest that the directors’ report should contain a description of 
the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company. This is extremely important given 
the current economic climate and the relevance and importance to readers of the financial 
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report. Types of risks that should be disclosed include strategic, operational and financial 
risks. Generally, these risks are disclosed in a tabular format with an evaluation of the impact 
and the actions surrounding the risk. (Deloitte, 2008) Undue, unexpected, and unusual risks 
should be defined in order to be useful to the user, as well as defining materiality thresholds. 
The Board’s responsibility includes the review of the company’s risk register with risks 
quantified where possible to ensure that management implements appropriate risk-
mmanagement responses and these responses are monitored. Both inherent and residual 
risks should be viewed in order to prioritise and direct resources to the correct risk (E&Y, 
2011; KPMG, 2009; KPMG, 2012). 
 
Within the financial impact section, for each of the key material issues (economic, 
environmental and social) the strategy, implementation, initiatives, management approach, 
risks and opportunities, material financial and non-financial indicators, a high level narrative 
description of the performance and objectives, as well as targets for current and future 
years, are suggested to be disclosed. (E&Y, 2011a) 
 
There are a number of minimum disclosure requirements in terms of the Risk Governance 
Chapter within King-III. These include a statement from the Board on three items relating to 
risk. Firstly, the Board need to disclose their responsibility for risk, and how they have 
satisfied themselves that risk assessments, responses and interventions are effective. This 
includes disclosing where the risks exceed or deviate materially from the risk appetite set. 
Secondly, they are required to include key sustainability risks, responses and the residual 
sustainability risks in terms of their risk assessment. Lastly, there needs to be a risk-
disclosure where any undue, unexpected and unusual risks that have been taken in pursuit 
of reward as well as material losses and causes need to be disclosed, including 
quantification and impact of the risks as well as responses and interventions that were 
implemented in order to prevent the reoccurrence. (E&Y, 2010; E&Y, 2009; PWC 2009; 
KPMG, 2009; KPMG, 2012) 
 
Additional disclosure from Literature review 
In paper 3, the IODSA (2010) suggests that integrated reporting should be the outcome of 
certain information collection processes within the organisation. Actual performance with 
regard to each issue and risk identified should be reported to stakeholders through the 
integrated report, including the target set, baseline, prior year performance and 
benchmarking against peers, industry norms or national averages. All issues that are 
pertinent to the business should be reported to give a complete and balanced view of the 
organisation. Reporting is resource-intensive and, therefore, companies are expected to 
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transition into a fully integrated report, with some companies being well into this process and 
some at the very beginning of implementation. It is essential that processes are in place in 
order to allow the complete, timely, accurate and accessible risk-disclosures to stakeholders 
(IODSA, 2010; E&Y, 2009a). 
 
Ernst and Young (2011a) suggest a content outline for risk-disclosures, as well as where 
they should be disclosed in the various sections of the report, which will be detailed in the 
subsequent paragraphs. Examples include, within the Chairman’s statement, the broad 
positive and negative aspects of the company’s performance in terms of ethics, economic, 
social and environmental aspects, as well as commentary on major issues and trends and 
the impact that these have on the company. E&Y also propose that within the CEO’s 
statement, suggested disclosure includes the information on the company’s integrated 
strategy, as well as information on market trends and issues and the link to company’s 
integrated strategy and key financial and sustainability priorities. Further, within the overview 
section, suggested disclosures include the company’s strategy, mission and values within a 
triple bottom line context, as well as the economic, environmental and social material issues 
and how the sustainability issues are identified by the company (E&Y, 2011a). 
 
In the sustainable development performance section, the programmes put in place and 
energy management plans are suggested be disclosed, as well as accounting policies and 
reporting standards used for measurement and include the definitions of the Key 
performance indicators [KPI’s], a prior year comparison to current year targets, any indirect 
company impacts and any forward-looking information and plans to reach targets. Within the 
financial performance section, financial results should be contextualised by reporting on the 
positive or negative impact that the company has had on stakeholders and the effectiveness 
of internal controls and risk-management process (E&Y, 2011a). The audit committee are 
responsible for ensuring that there is a combined risk approach to address significant and 
material risks (PWC, 2009; KPMG, 2012). 
 
A separate section for risk-disclosures that contains all key risks is suggested by E&Y, 
including sustainability risks and the responses to those risks and any residual risks. The 
impact, responses and interventions with regard to material losses and the quantification of 
these losses, as well as current, imminent and envisaged risks that threaten sustainability 
and a statement from the Board on their view of effectiveness of the risk-management 
process (E&Y, 2011a). 
 
The next chapter will detail the research methodology used to answer the research question. 
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CHAPTER THREE – RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.1 contains an examination of the mainstream 
accounting research or positivist paradigm, followed by a discussion of the interpretative 
methodology in an attempt to contextualise the selection of the interpretative research 
framework. A discussion on how the research instrument was derived, and how it was used 
to address the research question is included in Section 3.2. Sections 3.3 - 3.5 discuss both 
the population and sampling methods, as well as how the data will be collected and 
managed. Due to the exploratory nature of this study, the manner in which validity and 
reliability is ensured is dealt with in Section 3.6.  
 
3.1 Research design  
3.1.1 Research frameworks 
Chau (1986) describes three research paradigms in accounting, which can be differentiated 
based on their ontology, epistemology and methodology. Positivism represents a research 
framework that aims to observe objectively and measure phenomena numerically and, 
therefore, is generally performed using unbiased, scientific, and quantitative means. This 
scientific method has become the main research framework used in accounting research in 
South Africa (Coetsee, 2011; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011). Within a positivist research 
framework, the focus of the researcher is verification and measurability of phenomena in 
order to develop and test a theory, based on the premise that the researcher is a passive 
and independent observer. Generally, quantitative research methods are employed in this 
paradigm to collect data and develop these through various means into numeric measures 
allowing the utilisation of statistical data analysis techniques to test theories through 
hypothesis (Creswell, 2009; Coetsee 2011 and Merkl-Davies et al, 2011).  
 
In contrast, the interpretative paradigm has its foundation in exploring the interactions 
between social factors and enhancing understanding of how social order is both produced 
and reproduced. Interpretative research is driven by the utilisation of a subjective 
epistemological stance, relating to the creation of knowledge with the acceptance of the fact 
that this knowledge creation cannot be divorced from the researcher who created it. The 
methodology aims to capture meanings and interpretations whilst acknowledging the 
researcher’s subjectivity (Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Creswell 2009). Interpretive studies rely 
on the researcher as the research instrument and are subjective in nature, with themes 
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emerging by reading and re-reading the text. Through this process of interpretation, a 
deeper understanding is gained, contributing to the existing pool of knowledge (Coetsee, 
2011; Maroun, 2012; Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Creswell, 2009). Unerman (2000) notes 
that subjectivity does not itself pose threats to the validity and reliability of a study. Indeed, 
the acknowledgement of this subjectivity, together with a complete and transparent 
description of the analysis process allows for an in-depth analysis of the subject matter 
which more traditional scientific methods cannot provide (Elo and Kyngas, 2008; Unerman, 
2000). Interpretative research styles tend to be more qualitative with a higher degree of 
subjectivity than positivist methodologies. This does not, however, mean that interpretive 
research cannot make use of quantitative techniques to some extent (Creswell, 2009). 
Coetsee (2011), for instance, provides examples of studies employing mixed methods, in an 
exploratory setting, with the aim of highlighting the perceptions of stakeholders and the 
functioning of  social and cultural variables which  impact governance systems (Creswell, 
2009; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Coetsee, 2011).   
 
This study explores the trends in risk-disclosure in listed firms in South Africa after the 
introduction of King-III in March 20104 with the aim of contributing to the growing body of 
work exploring the effect of integrated reporting on South African corporate disclosures 
(Section 1.3). Due to the research being exploratory in nature, the interpretative accounting 
research framework is predominantly used to examine and investigate these trends. A 
disclosure checklist, based on emerging risk-disclosure themes identified in King-III and the 
prior literature (Section 2.3.2) is interpretively developed by the researcher. Various risk-
disclosure scores can then be computed, as discussed in Section 3.4 (adapted from Marx 
and Van Dyk, 2010; Barac et al, 2011). Using a combination of statistical techniques, 
changes in the nature and extent of risk-disclosures can be identified and interpretively 
analysed by the researcher (Section 3.4).  Although the method is primarily quantitative, the 
aim of the research is to explore emerging risk-disclosure themes, indirectly highlighting the 
practical application of the ‘Governance of Risk’ chapter (King-III) by preparers of integrated 
reports. The use of an interpretive-inspired technique is also justified by the absence of 
research of this nature and the difficulty of developing a generally accepted disclosure 
quality scale needed for more scientific methods (Creswell, 2009; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011). 
 
                                                 
4 Following King-II, the JSE requires listed companies to include in their annual report a disclosure of how they 
have complied with Corporate Governance principles. The introduction of King-III now requires JSE listed 
companies to integrate sustainability reporting into their financial reporting. (IODSA, 2009) 
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3.2 Research approach  
This research makes use of a multi-phase approach for collecting and analysing data. 
Firstly, a detailed content analysis of the prior corporate governance literature, including 
King-III and the discussion papers on integrated reporting, is used to identify key risk-
disclosure themes and requirements (Section 2.3.2; Section 3.2.1).  The risk-disclosure 
matrix (Appendix A) is then used to determine a risk-disclosure score (Section 3.4) and drive 
the initial analysis of risk-disclosures in the annual/integrated reports under review.  This is 
complemented by an interpretive text analysis to identify key examples for highlighting 
disclosure themes or trends (Section 4).  
 
Content Analysis 
Leedy and Omrod (2010) describe content analysis as a comprehensive, methodical 
assessment of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying and categorising 
the underlying material into patterns, themes or biases and which can also be used to 
develop a deeper understanding of what the relevant communication means through 
thorough analysis of the contents. Content analysis is concerned with the underlying 
meaning, intentions, consequence and context, and can be used to analyse theoretical 
issues with the intention of improving the understanding of various types of data, allowing 
inferences to be made from the underlying data to provide context, knowledge and new 
insights and serve as a practical guide in which to action this information.  
 
Accounting researchers have employed content analysis for a number of years in order to 
interrogate narratives through the extraction and analysis of data, and it is the most 
frequently used research method within corporate reporting research. Broadly speaking, 
there are two approaches to content analysis: mechanistic content analysis, where a 
dichotomous categorical index is used to score the completeness of information disclosed 
against a specific guideline which allows a numerical score to be produced from which 
conclusions can be drawn regarding disclosure practices, compliance with disclosure and a 
ranking between narratives. This form of content analysis is used to convert text into 
numerical scores and indices to draw statistical inferences about the types and intent of 
narrative disclosure. Although content analysis is subjective, when executed in a systematic 
and transparent manner this method enhances the understanding of corporate 
communication within an organisation (Elo and Kyngas, 2008; Leedy and Omrod, 2010). 
 
The alternative is interpretative content analysis, where the actual content of the narrative is 
analysed to understand disclosure practice (Beck et al, 2010; Elo and Kyngas, 2008; Merkl-
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Davies et al, 2011). Previous research and underlying theory will determine the choice of 
coding categories, as well as the sample selection and unit of analysis to ensure that the 
purpose of the study is fulfilled. This means that content analysis relates to the research 
methodology for analysing textual data but its use is dependent on the research paradigm of 
the research (Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Creswell 2009; Elo and Kyngas, 2008).   
 
Ultimately, the research question and aim of the study determine the selection of the 
research framework (Coetsee, 2011; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Creswell, 2009), and the 
specific selection and type of content analysis depends on the research question and 
purpose of the study. In this case, the first stage of this research makes use of an 
interpretively inspired content analysis to identify specific risk-disclosures and themes 
(categories) to compile the risk-disclosure matrix (Appendix A).  
 
Development and application of the risk-disclosure matrix  
Unerman (2000) referred to qualitative content analysis as being used to condense raw data 
into various categories through deduction and interpretation. This process begins with the 
underlying theory and relevant research being thoroughly understood through a literature 
review, and is followed by a set of systematic and transparent procedures that serve to 
interrogate the data and sort into the relevant categories (Unerman, 2000). 
 
This research follows a similar approach to Marx and van Dyk (2010) and Unerman (2000). 
The literature relating to corporate governance and sustainability development and practices 
was reviewed and summarised by the researcher. The process began with a detailed 
reading of the relevant corporate governance literature to provide a theoretical frame of 
reference (Section 2.1 to Section 2.3). The relevant academic and professional literature 
was then reviewed systematically (Unerman 2000) to identify preliminary disclosure themes 
or categories. The researcher then concentrated on the King-III provisions, particularly the 
‘Governance of Risk’ chapter. The entire chapter was interrogated on a line-by-line basis, 
with each principle being analysed in detail and formulated into a number of statements. 
Themes emerging from the literature regarding suggested disclosures were then aligned and 
incorporated into the risk-disclosure matrix to form the research instrument (Appendix A). 
The scorecard entries were further grouped into categories and themes by the researcher, 
similar to the approach followed by Solomon and Maroun (2012) in their analysis of the 
influence of King-III on social, ethical and environmental reporting on integrated reporting. 
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The disclosures were also classified as ‘to be disclosed’5 by King-III and ‘recommended’6 by 
King-III by the researcher based on the suggestions made within King-III and from the review 
of the literature (Appendix A). 
 
The content analysis and coding process allowed the researcher to complete a risk-
disclosure score as discussed in more detail in Section 3.5 (adapted from Marx and Van 
Dyk, 2010; Solomon and Maroun, 2012).. This numerical score allows conclusions to be 
drawn regarding risk-disclosure practices (Marx and Van Dyk, 2010; Solomon and Maroun, 
2012). The approach is similar to that followed by Barac et al (2011) who also utilised 
content analysis to review the state of governance practices at higher education institutions 
in South Africa by assessing the corporate governance disclosures in annual reports using 
content analysis to extract empirical evidence. Content analysis was selected as the 
research methodology to analyse the annual reports because the technique allows 
extraction of information not explicitly presented in a quantified and structured format but is 
implicit in the text. As is the case with this research, content analysis provides a systematic, 
cost effective and replicable technique for compressing text into fewer content categories 
through explicit rules of coding and involves the selection of analytical categories within the 
context of the material being analysed (Barac et al, 2011) 
 
The content analysis process followed by the researcher was predominately deductive, 
meaning that analytical categories were derived from both the existing research and 
underlying theory. It should also be noted that the content analysis process was iterative. As 
the researcher reviewed and coded reports, this led to the refinement of disclosure codes or 
categories presented in Section 2.4 and Appendix A. To ensure focus, the research question 
was always kept in mind, and the researcher constantly referred to the unit of analysis (being 
risk-disclosure provisions) to ensure that the analysis was effective (Merkl-Davies, 2011; Elo 
and Kyngas, 2008). 
.  
Interpretative text analysis 
The second phase of the research made use of interpretative text analysis in order to 
provide additional insights and explore trends in risk-disclosure and the patterns emerging 
from the integrated reports. For example, disclosures that highlight excessive repletion or a 
change in focus from shareholder to stakeholders (Solomon and Maroun, 2012) were used 
                                                 
5 For example “The Board should disclose any current, imminent or envisaged risk that may threaten the long-
term sustainability of the company” – principle 4.10, par. 55 of King-III 
6 For example “The risk-management plan should clearly identify responsibilities for monitoring risks” – 
principle 4.8, par. 47 of King-III 
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to highlight themes emerging in the risk-disclosure sections of the reports. As with all 
interpretive-inspired studies, the researcher became an integral part of the data collection 
and analysis process. Themes emerged during the course of coding the reports (as 
discussed above) and were extracted by reading and re-reading the text in an iterative 
process, and the text analysis and interpretation were reliant upon the researcher’s expertise 
and assumptions made (Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011). On 
occasion, the interpretive text analysis led to additional review and re-coding of risk-
disclosures but no significant changes to the risk-disclosure scores resulted (adapted from 
Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Creswell ,2009). 
 
3.3 Population size and sample 
This study focuses on the risk-disclosures as suggested by King-III (Chapter 4 – the 
Governance of Risk) by JSE listed companies post 1 March 2010 that are contained within 
the integrated report. In accordance with the Guidance letter on Integrated Reporting issued 
by the JSE on 27 June 2013, it was confirmed that Integrated Reporting is applied on an 
‘apply or explain’ basis (Lexis Nexis, 2013). 
 
Data was collected from annual/integrated reports of companies listed on the JSE from 1 
March 2010 to 31 March 2013, allowing for a lag period for companies to have implemented 
the suggested risk-disclosure requirements in King-III into their integrated reports. Only 
integrated/annual reports will be reviewed; complementary information such as sustainability 
reports or independent company overviews will not be analysed. This is in keeping with the 
focus on integrated reports as the primary means of communicating with stakeholders (IRC, 
2011; IIRC, 2011).  
 
Out of the total eligible population of 177, a final sample of 39 companies resulted. Similarly 
to Abdo and Fisher (2007), a cross-section of companies on the JSE was selected over a 
total of 8 sectors, allowing for an exploration of the relationship between risk-disclosure 
across companies and industry sectors. The companies within the sector were then ranked 
in terms of market capitalisation from highest to lowest as at 31 March 2013, and the sample 
selected from the highest market capitalizations. Only listed companies with their primary 
listing on the JSE (which consistently published an annual or integrated report over the three 
year period under review) were considered. Dual listed companies who are not primarily 
listed on the JSE are not required to produce an integrated report and were therefore been 
omitted from the study. The availability of reports was also taken into consideration. Only 
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reports available at the time that the research was conducted were included in the 
population. The sample selected has been summarized in Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Sample Selected   
Sector 
Total No of 
Companies 
Sample 
Selected7 
Additional 1 08 
Basic Materials 36 6 
Consumer Goods 20 6 
Consumer Services 36 6 
Financials 70 09 
Health Care 8 4 
Industrials 61 6 
Oil & Gas 1 1 
Technology 11 6 
Telecommunications 4 4 
Total Population 24810 
 
Excluding Financial Services 71 
Remaining Population 177 39 
Companies excluded as a result of 
criteria applied11 1 
Number of reports to be analysed 114 
 
The sample size is relatively small (39% coverage). Text analysis is, however, an extremely 
labour-intensive process, where smaller sample sizes are acceptable because the outcome 
is not meant to be generalised (Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011). 
Rather, individual annual/integrated reports were examined in detail to highlight key themes 
in the information contained therein; giving insights into the research question (Merkl-Davies 
et al, 2011). A similar interpretive method of research was used by Solomon and Maroun 
(2012) to explore the impact of integrated reporting on social, ethical and environmental 
reporting. A small sample was used because of the exploratory nature of this study and 
                                                 
7 The sample was selected from the applicable industry sectors as follows: half of the companies in the sector 
were selected, with the proviso that where this number was more than 6, a maximum of 6 were selected and a 
minimum of 4 companies. 
8 Financial Service companies were specifically excluded from the study because of the quantum of disclosure 
required for financial instruments in terms of IFRS7 as well as in Basel-III 
9 Financial Service companies were specifically excluded from the study because of the quantum of disclosure 
required for financial instruments in terms of IFRS7 as well as in Basel-III 
10 Population determined as:  all companies listed on the  JSE as at 31 March 2013 less those which  did not 
have published reports for the three consecutive years ending 31 March and companies which were  dual 
listed  
11 Upon review of sample selected, one company selected in the sample did not produce financials for the 
three consecutive years indicated in the sample due to a merger and was therefore omitted. 
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analysed in detail to reveal unique insights into the research question (Solomon and Maroun, 
2012). 
 
3.4 Data collection and analysis  
Each company’s annual/integrated report was analysed using the disclosure matrix as 
discussed in Section 3.1. A score of ‘0’ or ‘1’ was used to indicate the presence or absence 
of the respective risk-disclosure metric. No effort was made to assess the quality of the 
disclosure. The level of risk-disclosure was depicted by the ratio of the disclosure per set of 
annual/integrated report to the total disclosures per the scorecard for each category under 
review, developing a relative measure of risk-disclosure. By applying this factual scoring 
approach objectively quantifiable and comparable data was obtained (Abdo and Fisher, 
2007). Also, during the data collection phase, other variable information was collated from 
each company’s annual/integrated report. This included the total number of pages of the 
report, the number of times the word ‘risk’ was mentioned, as well as the number of pages 
contained in a separate disclosure section for risk (if applicable) and whether the company 
had a King-III disclosure checklist. 
 
As discussed in Section 3.1, each of the reports was read several times during the data 
collection process. Since the reports were in an electronic format, any preliminary 
identification was indicated by highlighting the relevant text. The analysis of the data entails 
a process of reading and re-reading to identify certain words or phrases that represent a 
disclosure within the risk-disclosure matrix, which were recorded on an excel spreadsheet, 
with a tab for each company being analysed. In addition, during the design phase of the risk-
disclosure scorecard, key words for each disclosure were identified by the researcher and 
assigned to each category. These keywords were used to search within each integrated 
report after the data has been extracted to ensure that no disclosures were omitted, and that 
the data extracted from each report was complete. 
 
Using the risk-disclosure scores, a disclosure frequency table was generated, showing the 
level of risk-disclosure for each company, for each year. Various descriptive statistics, 
including the identification of trends in disclosure levels over the three year period for each 
company, as well as across the industry sectors were analysed (Section 4). Included in the 
analysis is the frequency of disclosure table for each year per disclosure theme, as well as 
for the ’recommended’ and ‘to be disclosed’ classifications. Descriptive statistics (such as 
the mean, median, variance and standard deviation) were presented in tabular format as 
well as visually. The analysis was complemented by computing risk ratio score (Section 1.4) 
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in order to highlight the extent to which risk-disclosures were integrated in the annual reports 
(adapted from Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Carels et al, 2014). 
 
One-way within subjects (repeated measures) ANOVA tests were then performed to assess 
whether or not there is a statistically significant difference year-on-year in the extent of 
disclosure per disclosure theme (Section 4.2). Assumptions for the ANOVA were met. These 
include that there are no significant outliers in the differences between the related groups. 
The Mahalinobis Distance D2 was used to assess adherence to this assumption, with a case 
with a probability of D2 that is less than 0.001 considered to be a multivariate outlier. The 
residuals were also approximately normally distributed and ‘robust’ to violations of normality. 
The final assumption that was met was sphericity, where variances of differences between 
all combinations of related groups must be equal.  
 
Using the other variable information gathered during the data collection including: the total 
number of pages of the report; the number of times the word ‘risk’ was mentioned; the 
number of pages contained in a separate disclosure section for risk (if applicable) and 
whether the company had a King-III disclosure checklist, various descriptives are presented, 
including the calculation of a risk ratio for the companies over the years analysed, as well as 
per sector. A Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation [rho] was used to calculate the strength of 
the relationship between sets of data. Spearmans’s rho is a non-parametric alternative to 
Pearson’s product-moment correlation and makes no assumption regarding the distributions 
of variables in the population. Spearman’s test ranks the data first and then applies 
Pearson’s equation to these ranks (Field, 2005).  Spearman’s rho was selected to determine 
if there is any correlation between the disclosure themes, overall risk-disclosure scores and 
other variables as a result of the departure from normal of the distributions of the variables. 
Different authors suggest different interpretations of the correlation coefficient. Guidelines as 
suggested by Cohen (1988) were used for this analysis as follows:  r=.10 to .29 or r=-.10 to -
.29 represents a small significance; r=.30 to .49 or r=-.30 to -.49 represents a medium 
significance and r=.50 to 1.00 or r=-.50 to -1.00 represents a large significance (Cohen, 
1988). (As the Spearman’s rho is a non-parametric test, it provides useful complementary 
evidence in support of the results generated by the ANOVA12.) 
 
A K-means clustering was selected to analyse the data further. The intention was not to 
triangulate results using multiple statistical techniques in a positivist sense. Instead, the 
                                                 
12 Although the assumptions for the use of the ANOVA were met, the non-parametric analysis provides 
evidence in support of the results generated by the ANOVA (Section 4.2.2). This provides additional assurance 
that the results of the study are valid. 
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cluster analysis (similar to factor analysis) is used in an interpretive context to highlight risk-
disclosure themes or categories. The appropriateness of the choice and use of this 
technique was also confirmed by an independent statistician. Cluster analysis is a 
multivariate, exploratory technique designed to reveal natural groupings that may exist in the 
data themselves. The goal is to partition a set of observations into two or more groups based 
on the similarity of observations on a set of specified characteristics, attempting to maximise 
the homogeneity of objects within clusters while also maximising the heterogeneity between 
the clusters. As the intention was to aggregate the findings (Section 4.3) and add to the 
exploratory potential of the study, traditional robustness tests or measures, such as tests for 
normality, tests for homoscedasticity and the Chronbach alpha were not included.  
 
The observations used for the clustering were the standardised version of the 2012 values of 
the total number of pages in a report, the number of times ‘risk’ was mentioned, the total 
risk-disclosure score, and whether the company had a separate risk-disclosure section and a 
King-III disclosure checklist. The K-means cluster was used in this study, where ‘K’ refers to 
number of clusters and ‘means’ refers to the fact that the centroid method (mean of each 
cluster’s cases) is used to calculate distance (Hair et al, 2010). 
 
Throughout the analysis of the integrated reports, a number of specific themes or patterns 
emerged either within a particular company, as an industry or throughout the total sample. 
Certain excerpts within the integrated reports were identified by the researcher and in order 
to interpret and convey themes and messages are presented in the analysis (See section 
3.2 for discussion on the interpretive text analysis process). 
 
3.5 Data management 
The integrated report (or annual report as detailed above) for each company which forms 
part of the sample was extracted from the company’s official website and saved in a 
designated folder for ease of reference and identifiability. An Excel workbook will be used to 
capture the data extracted from the qualifying reports with a worksheet for each company 
under examination. 
 
3.6 Validity and reliability 
Validity is determined by the sample size selected. The sample in this study was 
purposefully selected to ensure a range of companies across various industries so not to 
bias the sample. The relatively small sample size is not, in itself, a threat to validity and 
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reliability. As discussed in Section 3.3, text analysis in itself is an extremely labour-intensive 
process, where smaller sample sizes are acceptable because the outcome is not meant to 
be generalised: rather, each source of data is interrogated to extract the information 
contained therein, giving insights into the research question (Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; 
Creswell 2009). 
 
Reliability and quality of content analysis result from providing an adequate and transparent 
description of both the analysis process13 and results to a sufficient level of detail that allows 
an in-depth understanding of how the analysis was carried out, as well as strengths and 
limitations inherent in the methodology. Although the development of the disclosure checklist 
(Section 2) is informed by the provisions of King-III, and relevant academic literature, the 
interpretive analysis of the annual/integrated reports means that replication of this study in a 
positivist sense could prove problematic (Elo and Kyngas, 2008).  This is not, however, a 
threat to validity or reliability of the research.  The aim of interpretive-inspired research is to 
explore the underlying subject matter, rather than study it in a purely scientific fashion 
(Maroun, 2012; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011).  
 
Research quality was safeguarded by piloting the disclosure checklist to ensure its 
completeness and appropriateness using two sets of annual/integrated reports (Creswell, 
2009).  The initial pilot process, as well as the final risk-disclosure matrix (Appendix A), was 
also reviewed by an independent researcher to ensure completeness. As a final check, the 
researcher confirmed – where possible – that the disclosure score assigned to companies 
was consistent (in terms of ranking) with similar studies evaluating the disclosure of listed 
South African companies (these included Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Makiwana and Padia, 
2011; E&Y, 2011)  
 
An iterative data collection and analysis process (Section 3.1) involving the methodical 
reading of annual/integrated reports; cross-referencing of relevant disclosures to the 
checklist; and consistent application of the checklist adds to the reliability of the findings 
(Merkl-Davies et al, 2011; Creswell, 2009). As such, although the researcher is inextricably 
part of the data collection and analysis process, adequate steps were taken to ensure result 
validity (Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Merkl-Davies et al, 2011). In particular, an ANOVA, 
Spearman Rho and K-cluster analysis was used to provide aggregated or summarised 
results, reducing the extent to which the researcher was involved in the reduction of findings. 
                                                 
13 All decisions have been documented as transparently as possible so that steps can easily be retraced 
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These techniques also provided consistent results (Section 4.2) giving additional assurance 
that findings are relevant and reliable.  
 
Where using an ANOVA, the researcher also tested for normality of data and homogeneity 
of variances to ensure the valid application of the parametric technique. In addition, a non-
parametric test (the Spearman Rho) was purposefully selected to provide complementary 
evidence. The researcher also included a K-cluster analysis as an ‘objective’ means of 
summarising results and highlighting important themes or issues identified during the initial 
analysis phase (Section 4.1). Ultimately, this ensures that the results are documented in a 
clear and concise fashion to ensure transparency of the findings, allowing readers to assess 
the arguments raised and reach their own conclusions (Elo and Kyngas, 2008). 
 
The following section contains the results of the analysis performed. 
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CHAPTER FOUR - RESULTS 
 
4.1 Chapter outline 
This section is divided into two sub-sections. In the first, a descriptive review is performed on 
various risk-disclosure metrics. This includes an analysis of the overall risk-disclosure scores 
and a review of the themes and patterns from the interpretive text analysis. The frequency of 
individual disclosure themes is analysed, together with the disclosure classifications and 
related statistics. Other variables, including the number of total pages in each report, the 
number of ’risk’ mentions and the length of the separate risk-disclosure sections were used 
to create various ratios to contribute to the discussion. The sub-section concludes with 
Spearman’s correlation co-efficient analysis, examining the relationships between the 
variables, disclosure themes and risk-disclosure scores. 
 
The second section examines disclosure trends per sector. A K-means clustering is 
performed on the 2012 values, allowing the formation of four clusters, utilising the various 
attributes and then analysing per sector featuring the a market capitalisation comparison 
across clusters. 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics 
4.2.1 Total risk-disclosure matrix scores 
As noted in Section 3.5, data was collected from a sample of 3914 companies in the risk-
disclosure matrix. Figure 1 depicts the risk-disclosure matrix scores for each company per 
year from the risk-disclosure matrix (Appendix A). 
 
                                                 
14 During testing it was noted that one of the companies in the sample selected based on market capitalisation 
on 31 March 2013 did not have three consecutive annual reports due to a merger in 2011 and was, therefore, 
excluded from the analysis, leaving 38 companies in the sample tested. 
  
Figure 1 reveals a general increase in the volume of 
integrated reports year-on-year, with the average of the 
from 35.37 in 2010 to 41.21 in 2011
the findings of Ntim et al (2013) where results showed evidence of a general increase in the 
corporate risk-disclosure level
 
An increase in the integration of risks in specific integrated reports in the sample was also 
noted. Information presented i
and principle risks and opportunities for current and future activities. Certain companies had 
a significant amount of well laid
categories identified. An excellent example of the integration of risk was noted in the 2012 
integrated report of Company 12. This report
policy, definitions of ‘materiality’, a summary of each material sustainability r
each operational and country review
the objectives of the company. Also included in the integrated report was a risk matrix which 
identified the potential impact and likelihood of eac
controls and action plans.  
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EXTRACT 1: COMPANY 12 (2012) 
 
 
In Ernst & Young’s Excellence in Integrated Reporting Awards 2013, Company 12 was one 
of their top ten best integrated reports: it was specifically noted that one of the reasons for 
this related to the disclosure in terms of strategy, goals and objectives that were clearly set 
out in the report. Disclosures included detailed information against previous performance, as 
well as objectives and targets and the major risk areas (E&Y, 2013).  
 
Another example of a clear understanding of the purpose of integrated reporting was 
Company 2, with an overall risk-disclosure score of 52 in 2012. This report contains a 
section entitled ‘Strategic risks’ which details the reasons and criteria why risks are 
considered material; how they are managed; and actual performance in terms of set criteria, 
as well as the organisation’s commitments for the future. In previous years, the information 
was present in a number of different sections but in 2012, the information was condensed 
into consecutive sections, adding value to the user and making the risk-management policy 
and process transparent and understandable. For example, Extract 2 highlights the 
emphasis placed on stakeholders’ objectives, communication and risk monitoring and review 
(Company 2): 
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EXTRACT 2: COMPANY 2 (2012) 
 
 
Both Company 12 (at 6% above the mean risk-disclosure level) and Company 2, (at 20% 
above the mean risk-disclosure level) were noted as having an excellent level of information 
and easy-to-use risk information, integrating strategy and risk-management into their reports. 
 
Company 26 had the highest risk-disclosure score. It was also noted as having excellent 
user-friendly and understandable risk-disclosure information. In 2012, Company 26 
disclosed not only how key stakeholders were identified and consulted, but also the issues 
identified by stakeholders and how management addressed each concern. Material issues 
were then presented in a tabular format, combining the definition of the risk, the response 
strategy of the organisation and the status of this mitigation strategy. Where applicable, the 
material issues are cross referenced within the integrated report where further detail on the 
risk given and key performance indicators can be found. In another section of the report, a 
‘2012 Integrated performance scorecard’ is presented, containing not only financial, but non-
financial measures with targets set in the previous year, progress towards those targets and 
new targets set for the next financial year. Key environmental issues are further defined and 
mitigation strategies are detailed in the next section of the financials. A detailed and specific 
risk-management policy and plan is presented in a separate section dealing with overall risk 
review, including definitions of ‘risk tolerance’ and ‘appetite’ and information on how risks are 
assessed. The extract from the financials illustrates the level of detail and cross referencing 
included in the financials (Company 27, 2012): 
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EXTRACT 3: COMPANY 26 (2012) 
 
 
This relationship between the risk-disclosure score and the quality of the risk-disclosure 
noted in Company 26 was not, however, a common occurrence. In a number of reports there 
was little or no change in the wording of the risk-disclosures. This repetition of disclosure 
from one year to the next does little to enhance the usefulness of the integrated report for 
stakeholder decision-making (Solomon and Maroun, 2012; Carels et al, 2014). Likewise, the 
provision of only generic and unsubstantiated risk-management information is not consistent 
with the need for high quality integrated reporting (IRC, 2011). For example, several cases 
were noted where risk-management information made no reference to specific outcomes or 
tangible measurements. Examples are noted below. 
 
‘Risks are continually being identified and mitigated in terms of a process that 
involves allocating responsibility, developing action plans, and monitoring compliance 
with these action plans.’  (Company 17, 2010, pg. 26/2011, pg. 36) 
 
‘The objective of risk management in the Group is to establish an integrated and 
effective risk management framework within which important risks are identified, 
quantified and managed in order to achieve an optimal risk/reward profile. An 
integrated approach ensures that risk management is incorporated into the day-to-
day operational management processes and therefore allows management to focus 
on core activities.’ (Company 19, 2010, pg. 63/2011, pg. 62/2012, pg. 69) 
 
There was little indication of which ‘risks’ the above companies were referring to coupled 
with a lack of detail on exactly how risk-identification and management policies and 
procedures actually function.  Although the reports made reference to an ‘integrated 
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approach’ for risk-management and disclosure, there were few or no examples and a lack of 
clear cross-referencing between risk and other sections of the ‘integrated reports’.  In several 
instances, generic risk-management disclosures were repeated verbatim over the period 
analysed. This is consistent with Mayorga and Sidhu (2012) who found that, although there 
was a reasonable level of compliance because of  ‘boilerplate’ disclosures, the information 
provided in these disclosures was not informative and fails to achieve the intended effect of 
integrated reporting  (Mayorga and Sidhu, 2012). 
 
In light of this fact, it should be noted that the risk-disclosure scores (Figure 1) measure the 
quantum, rather than the quality, of the risk-disclosure in the reports reviewed. While there 
are some examples of excellent integrated reports where companies scored well on the 
disclosure checklist (For example, Company 2, 12 and 26) generic risk-management 
disclosure can result in annual reports with a high disclosure score but which are not fully 
aligned with the principle of providing integrated decision-useful information to users of the 
reports.  In fact, of all companies under review, including those with above average scores, 
at least some degree of repetition, or the provision of only generic information, was noted.  
 
In summary, the initial analysis of the integrated reports highlighted an increase in the 
quantity of risk-related information included in the reports. There were examples of 
companies providing high quality reports which scored well on the disclosure checklists (see 
also E&Y, 2012; Solomon and Maroun, 2012).  In contrast, many companies included only 
generic information in their reports which accounted for most of the increase in disclosure 
scores from 2010 to 2012. Overall, whether increase in disclosure score is indicative of a 
legalistic application of codes of governance or the growing awareness of the importance of 
risk-management by companies requires additional analysis.
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These statistics suggest that the introduction of King-III in 2009, and focus on risk by the 
integrated reporting initiative (2009/2010), has led to an initial increase in risk-disclosures 
from 2010 to 2011, consistent with the findings of Solomon and Maroun (2012) and 
Makiwana and Padia (2011). This corroborates the overall annual increase as noted in the 
overall risk-disclosure scores in Figure 1. 
 
Descriptive statistics per disclosure theme 
The frequency of disclosure for each company, using an aggregated disclosure count for 
each disclosure theme (Section 2.3.2), is presented in Table 3 below. 
  
Table 3: Frequency of Disclosure table 
Descriptive Statistics 
Theme: Measure 2010 2011 2012 
Overall risk-disclosures Mean 2.32 2.61 2.76 
  Median 2 2.5 3 
  Std. Deviation 1.016 1.054 1.125 
  Minimum 0 0 0 
  Maximum 5 5 5 
Delegation of responsibilities Mean 7.39 8.32 8.29 
  Median 7 8 8 
  Std. Deviation 2.175 1.947 1.902 
  Minimum 1 3 4 
  Maximum 12 12 12 
Risk tolerance levels Mean 1.53 2.11 2.03 
  Median 1.5 2 2 
  Std. Deviation 1.179 1.11 1.284 
  Minimum 0 0 0 
  Maximum 5 5 5 
Risk-management policy and plan Mean 4.24 4.92 5.21 
  Median 4 4 4.5 
  Std. Deviation 2.562 2.735 2.35 
  Minimum 0 0 1 
  Maximum 14 14 11 
Monitoring of risk-management Mean 4.82 5.13 5.47 
  Median 5 5 6 
  Std. Deviation 2.091 2.056 2.31 
  Minimum 1 0 0 
  Maximum 8 8 10 
Key risks Mean 2.92 3.76 4.45 
  Median 3 4 4 
  Std. Deviation 1.915 1.974 2.243 
  Minimum 1 1 1 
  Maximum 9 9 9 
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Risk assessments Mean 6.16 6.82 6.89 
  Median 7 7 8 
  Std. Deviation 2.15 2.065 2.115 
  Minimum 1 0 1 
  Maximum 9 9 10 
Additional disclosures Mean 5.97 7.53 8.03 
  Median 6 8 8 
  Std. Deviation 2.625 2.512 2.296 
  Minimum 0 0 1 
  Maximum 11 11 12 
Table 3 indicates that for the years under review, 6 out of the 8 themes increased year-on-
year, with the exception being the relatively flat means in the ‘Delegation of responsibilities’ 
and ‘Risk tolerance’ themes. This suggests that this disclosure was already present before 
the introduction of King-III. For a number of the disclosure themes, there were companies 
which did not disclose any of the risk-disclosures in the disclosure theme – this was noted in 
every theme except in the ‘Key risks’ theme.  
 
The increase in the level of disclosure noted in the majority of themes, together with the 
minimums remaining at zero for the majority of the disclosures themes, indicates that the 
IRC and King-III did not have the consistent effect of increasing disclosures. This raises 
concerns about whether companies are complying with disclosures required, without giving 
due consideration to the value that the disclosures could add. The highest level of disclosure 
was noted in the ‘Risk-management policy and plan’ category with 14 disclosures in both 
2010 and 2011 from this theme, further discussed below. To further assess these disclosure 
themes, possible risk-disclosures were classified as ‘to be disclosed’ and ‘recommended’ by 
King-III in each disclosure theme (as per Section 3.2.2). Table 4 presents the descriptive 
statistics for these classifications. 
 
Table 4: Frequency of ‘To be disclosed’ and ‘Recommended’ 
  Descriptive Statistics 
Classification: Measure 2010 2011 2012 
To be disclosed Mean 1.66 2.16 2.34 
  Median 2 2 2 
  Std. Deviation 1.072 1.151 1.4 
  Minimum 0 0 0 
  Maximum 4 5 6 
Recommended Mean 33.68 39.03 40.79 
  Median 35 39.5 41.5 
  Std. Deviation 9.696 8.9 9.008 
  Minimum 5 18 20 
  Maximum 64 65 61 
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Out of the possible 8 risk categories ‘to be disclosed’, the maximum number of disclosures 
occurred in 2012. In each year under review, there was at least one company that did not 
disclose any of the ‘to be disclosed’ risks. The average number of ‘to be disclosed’ risks  
increased over the three years from 1.66 in 2010 to 2.16 in 2011 to 2.34 in 2012.  
 
The ‘to be disclosed’ disclosures relate to core disclosures which are relevant to every 
company, for example that ‘The Board should also disclose its views on the effectiveness of 
the company‘s risk-management processes in the integrated report’. The recommended 
disclosures are optional for companies, for example ‘The risk-management plan should 
clearly identify responsibilities for monitoring risks’. Out of the possible 101 risk-disclosures 
in the ‘recommended’ classification, the maximum level of disclosure was during 2011 
(Score = 65), dropping to a score of  61 in 2012, whilst the average number of disclosures 
increased from 33.68 in 2010 to 39.03 in 2011 to 40.79 in 2012. This generic increase in 
both classifications indicates that companies do not view the classification between ‘to be 
disclosed’ and ‘recommended’ as significant when deciding what disclosure should be 
included in their integrated reports, resulting in a checklist attitude. For example, in the 
‘Overall risk-disclosures’, 87% of the reports disclosed that the Board is responsible for the 
overall governance of risk, a ‘recommended disclosure’, while only 26% of the companies 
disclosed an overall view on effectiveness of risk-management, one of the ‘to be disclosed’ 
classifications. 
 
Similarly, high risk-disclosure was noted in the ‘Delegation of responsibilities’  theme, 
although the nature of disclosure in this theme relates mainly to the delegation by the Board 
surrounding responsibility for risk-management, as well as the charters and mandates 
detailing these responsibilities. Therefore, this type of risk-disclosure does not necessarily 
improve the quality of the risk-disclosure in the integrated reports but contributes significantly 
to the risk-disclosure scores.  
 
The highest level of disclosure was noted across the ‘Risk assessments’ disclosure theme, 
with 36 companies specifically disclosing having an ongoing risk assessment process that 
included risk identification. In the ‘Additional disclosures’ theme, it was also noted that 36 
companies contextualised their financial results in some manner by reporting on positive and 
negative impacts that the company has on stakeholders and the effectiveness of internal 
controls and the risk-management process, a crucial element of risk-disclosure in integrated 
reporting. The overall risk-disclosure scores revealed the highest overall score was 
Company 26, with consecutive scores of 68, 69 and 65 for the years in review. In 2012, of 
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the total 65 risk-disclosures, only 4 fell in the ‘To be disclosed’ category, meaning that only 
half of the possible ‘to be disclosed’ risk-disclosures were included in the annual report. This 
affirms the view that companies are applying King-III as a disclosure checklist, providing only 
the information that they feel obligated to disclose. 
 
Other Variables  
As per Section 3.5, a number of variables were included in the data collection, including: the 
total number of pages, the number of times ‘risk’ was mentioned, the number of pages in the 
separate risk-disclosure section and whether or not the company had a separate King-III 
disclosure checklist. Figure 2 represents the average statistics. 
 
 
 
The average number of pages in the report increased from 168.76 in 2010 to 181.95 in 2011 
and then decreased to 176.11 in 2012. The average number of pages in the separate risk-
disclosure section increased from 1.61 in 2010 to 2.89 in 2011 to 3.55 in 2012. The average 
number of times the word ‘risk’ is mentioned in the report increased from 179.55 in 2010 to 
195.79 in 2011 and then remained fairly consistent at 193.84 in 2012.  
 
A factor contributing to the increase in the number of times ‘risk’ was mentioned in the 
integrated reports could be the repetition of risks in a number of different sections in the 
reports, as discussed in Section 4.2.1. Several companies had annual reports with a 
considerable amount of repetition in some risk elements, such as safety issues appearing in 
almost every section of the report, with the exception of the annual financial statements. This 
2010 2011 2012
Number of pages in report 169 182 176 
Number of times 'risk' mentioned 180 196 194 
Number of pages in separate risk 
section 2 3 4 
-
1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
4 
4 
155 
160 
165 
170 
175 
180 
185 
190 
195 
200 
Figure 2: Other Variables
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calls into question the link between financial and non-financial disclosures and the extent to 
which information is being appropriately integrated in the annual reports. 
 
Ernst and Young (2012) note that there was a correlation between length and effectiveness, 
with shorter integrated reports generally having more relevant disclosure. Mayorga and 
Sidhu (2012) also noted concerns regarding the volume and complexity of the information 
being disclosed as it can be both distracting and confusing to users who are trying to 
establish what is relevant for decision-making.  
 
Using both the number of times ‘risk’ is mentioned in the report and the total number of 
pages in the report, a ‘risk ratio’ was computed and presented in Figure 3. In addition, the 
risk-disclosure scores were compared to the number of pages in the report per year 
analysed to calculate a risk-disclosure score per page, and presented in Figure 3. 
 
 
On average, in 2010 the number of ‘risk’ mentions matched the number of pages in the 
report (1.083 mentions per page), while in 2011 and 2012, the number of ‘risk’ mentions 
exceeded the number of pages in the report (1.11 mentions per page). At least one company 
had fewer mentions than pages in all three years, with 2012 having at least one company 
with approximately one mention for every 3 pages. From the reports analysed, it was 
interesting to note that the pattern in the number of ‘risk’ mentions per page varied 
significantly across companies. For example, Company 24 starts in 2010 with a ratio of 
almost 2 mentions per page, dropping to just under 1 mention per page and dropping further 
to approximately one mention every three pages whilst the risk-disclosure score increased 
from 29 in 2010 to 40 in 2011, and remained flat in 2012.  
 
2010 2011 2012
Average risk ratio 1.083 1.113 1.110
Average risk disclosure ratio 0.229 0.249 0.265
Average risk disclosure score 35.37 41.21 43.16 
-
5.00 
10.00 
15.00 
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25.00 
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40.00 
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0.200
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Figure 3: Average risk ratio
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Overall, Figure 3 - read with Figure 1 in Section 4.2.1 - suggests that, although there has 
been an increase in the extent of risk-related disclosure, this has gone hand-in-hand with an 
increase in the length of the report. The result is that the average quantity of risk information 
per section of the report has remained relatively unchanged from 2010 to 2012. Taking into 
account the extent of repetition noted in Section 4.1 this implies that first sets of integrated 
reports have not achieved the objective of providing high quality, succinct information to 
stakeholders.  The same conclusion can be reached when considering the results in Section 
4.2.2 where the increase across disclosure themes and classifications indicates that 
companies are applying King-III as a ‘tick box’ disclosure checklist, and providing only the 
information that they feel obligated to disclose.   
 
Instances where high disclosure scores (Figure 1) and reports of above average length were 
most common was when the company included a disclosure checklist.  This is highlighted by 
Figure 4 which shows the average page length, risk-disclosure score for companies with and 
without a disclosure checklist in their annual or integrated report during 2012. During 2010, 
only 1 company in the sample had a separate checklist, with this increasing to 5 in 2011 and 
a further 13 in 2012, as depicted below. 
 
Company 30, for example, included a 57 page King-III disclosure checklist in their 2012 
integrated report, increasing the total number of pages in their reports from 2010 to 2012 by 
90%, with a corresponding increase in their risk-disclosure scores by only 36%, from 39 to 
53. Also worth noting is that the number of times the word ‘risk’ was mentioned increased 
over the same period by 240%, as depicted in Figure 4.The increase in risk-disclosure 
scores, as well as the risk-disclosure score per page, can be attributed mainly to the 
inclusion of the King-III disclosure checklist with short phrases fulfilling the disclosure score 
criteria, but not enhancing either usefulness or understanding of the risks that the company 
faces. The increase in the ‘risk’ mentions without a corresponding increase in the risk-
Average number of pages Average risk disclosure score Total number of reports
With King-III checklist 197.31 45.23 13
Without King-III checklist 165.08 42.08 25
-
50.00 
100.00 
150.00 
200.00 
250.00 
Figure 4: King-III disclosure checklists
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disclosure scores supports conclusions regarding the increase in quantity but not necessarily 
quality disclosures. 
 
On average, in 2010, the risk-disclosure score per page was 0.229, increasing to 0.249 in 
2011 and further to 0.265 in 2012, reflecting the increase in the total risk-disclosure scores. 
Figure 4 shows that companies are not providing ‘denser’ information, but simply increasing 
the volume, with a corresponding increase in the number of pages in the reports. This is not 
in line with the vision of King-III and the IRC - that integrated reporting should enable the 
organisation to integrate sustainability into the day-to-day business strategy and operations, 
resulting in a comprehensive process represented in a report that not only explains how 
sustainability is connected to the organisation’s strategy but also how sustainability 
performance, risk and targets are measured and monitored (E&Y, 2011b; E&Y, 2009; IRC, 
2011). To examine this in more detail, the relationship between the ‘classes’ of risk-
disclosure was analysed using a Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient Analysis.   
60
 
 Sp
ea
rm
an
’s
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
In
 o
rd
er
 t
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 t
he
re
 a
re
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
ps
 b
et
w
ee
n 
pa
irs
 o
f 
th
e 
ris
k-
di
sc
lo
su
re
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
va
ria
bl
es
, 
th
es
e 
w
er
e 
su
bj
ec
te
d 
to
 
Sp
ea
rm
an
’s
 c
or
re
la
tio
na
l a
na
ly
si
s 
fo
r t
he
 2
01
21
5  r
is
k-
di
sc
lo
su
re
 (S
ec
tio
n 
3.
5)
.  
 Ta
bl
e 
5:
 S
pe
ar
m
an
’s
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t 
  
O
ve
ra
ll 
ris
k-
di
sc
lo
su
r
e 
D
el
eg
at
io
n 
of
 
re
sp
on
si
b
ili
tie
s 
R
is
k 
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
ls
 
R
is
k-
 
m
an
ag
e-
m
en
t 
po
lic
y 
pl
an
 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 ri
sk
- 
m
an
ag
-
em
en
t 
K
ey
 ri
sk
s 
R
is
k 
as
se
ss
-
m
en
ts
 
A
dd
iti
on
al
 
di
sc
lo
su
r
es
 
R
is
k-
di
sc
lo
su
r
e 
sc
or
e 
P
ag
es
 in
 
se
pa
ra
te
 
ris
k 
se
ct
io
n 
P
ag
es
 –
 
K
in
g-
III
 
di
sc
lo
su
r
e 
ch
ec
kl
is
t 
N
um
be
r 
of
 ‘r
is
k’
 
m
en
tio
ns
 
To
ta
l 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
ag
es
 
in
 re
po
rt 
O
ve
ra
ll 
ris
k-
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
D
el
eg
at
io
n 
of
 re
sp
on
si
bi
lit
ie
s 
.3
60
*  
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
is
k 
to
le
ra
nc
e 
le
ve
ls
 
.4
51
**
 
0.
29
2 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
is
k-
m
an
ag
em
en
t p
ol
ic
y 
pl
an
 
.5
62
**
 
0.
19
9 
.5
21
**
 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
M
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 ri
sk
-m
an
ag
em
en
t 
.4
81
**
 
0.
26
 
0.
18
2 
.4
04
*  
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
K
ey
 ri
sk
s 
.3
60
*  
0.
29
2 
.6
69
**
 
.5
78
**
 
.4
07
*  
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
R
is
k 
as
se
ss
m
en
ts
 
0.
13
2 
0.
09
5 
.5
09
**
 
0.
24
4 
0.
22
3 
.4
40
**
 
1 
  
  
  
  
  
  
A
dd
iti
on
al
 d
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
-0
.0
53
 
-0
.1
52
 
.4
56
**
 
0.
06
1 
-0
.2
39
 
.3
27
*  
.3
66
*  
1 
  
  
  
  
  
R
is
k-
di
sc
lo
su
re
 s
co
re
 
.6
06
**
 
.4
08
*  
.7
97
**
 
.7
18
**
 
.5
23
**
 
.8
47
**
 
.5
60
**
 
.3
75
*  
1 
  
  
  
  
P
ag
es
 in
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
ris
k 
se
ct
io
n 
0.
12
5 
0.
12
1 
0.
19
6 
0.
01
4 
-0
.2
67
 
0.
01
3 
-0
.0
87
 
.4
11
*  
0.
13
3 
1 
  
  
  
P
ag
es
 –
 K
in
g-
III
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
ch
ec
kl
is
t 
0.
31
8 
0.
09
5 
.4
94
**
 
0.
10
2 
-0
.2
18
 
0.
17
 
0.
13
8 
.5
04
**
 
.3
58
*  
.3
57
*  
1 
  
  
N
um
be
r o
f ‘
ris
k’
 m
en
tio
ns
 
0.
08
3 
0.
18
3 
-0
.0
83
 
-0
.0
23
 
0.
15
 
0.
09
5 
-0
.1
77
 
0.
02
7 
0.
09
6 
0.
22
5 
-0
.0
48
 
1 
  
To
ta
l n
um
be
r o
f p
ag
es
 in
 
re
po
rt 
0.
26
8 
0.
23
6 
0.
08
9 
0.
10
1 
-0
.0
45
 
0.
04
5 
-0
.1
8 
0.
18
 
0.
17
7 
.6
52
**
 
0.
25
5 
.4
60
**
 
1 
*.
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
**
. C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
. 
     
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
15
 2
01
2 
w
as
 se
le
ct
ed
 fo
r a
na
ly
sis
 d
ue
 to
 th
e 
qu
an
tu
m
 o
f t
he
 ri
sk
-d
isc
lo
su
re
s w
ith
in
 th
e 
re
po
rt
s,
 a
nd
 a
s t
hi
s i
s t
he
 m
os
t r
ec
en
t d
at
a 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
it 
w
as
 c
on
sid
er
ed
 m
os
t 
w
or
th
w
hi
le
 to
 u
se
 th
is 
da
ta
. 
61 
 
The Spearman’s rho revealed some statistically significant relationships in the variables 
analysed. As expected, there was a significant relationship between the risk-disclosure 
scores and each of the disclosure themes. The highest correlation was noted between the 
‘Key Risk’ theme and the risk-disclosure score (rs(38)=0.847,p<0.5). 
 
Companies with high ‘Risk Assessment’ disclosures tend to disclose both risk tolerance 
levels and key risks but did not include significant disclosure on risk monitoring and risk-
management. This could suggest that, while generic disclosures are provided in terms of 
how risks are assessed and at what tolerance levels, the detailed policies and procedures on 
how risks are dealt with is lacking, supporting the argument of risk-disclosure being dealt 
with only to meet legal requirements (Section 4.2).  
 
The total number of pages in the report is not correlated to any of the disclosure themes or 
to the overall risk-disclosure score.  A high correlation is only noted between the total 
number of pages in the report and the number of times ‘risk’ is mentioned, supporting the 
argument that the length of the report does not have an effect on the quality of the risk-
disclosures (see also Figure 4). In addition, companies with King-III disclosure checklists 
tend to have higher disclosure scores (Figure 4) but this is not necessarily resulting in more 
useful reporting.  
 
Companies with a separate risk-disclosure section tend to have more disclosures in the 
‘Additional disclosures’ theme. This includes information on sustainability performance 
against targets, forward-looking information, risk-management plans and an indication of the 
risk impacts on stakeholders.  Companies which have higher ‘Additional disclosure’ scores 
were, however, also more likely to include a King-III checklist in their annual report. 
 
Finally, it was noted that the ‘Delegation of Responsibilities’ disclosures were not 
significantly correlated with other disclosure themes. This can be attributed to the nature of 
disclosures included in this theme. The low correlation with other key risk-disclosure themes, 
coupled with a significant correlation with the total risk-disclosure score does, however, 
suggest that ‘delegation of responsibility’ disclosures may be inflating the disclosure score 
(and length of the reports) without adding much value for stakeholders.  
 
In order to interrogate relationships between the classes of disclosures, the next section 
concentrates on risk-disclosure scores, disclosure themes per sector. 
 
 4.3 Industry sector comparisons
A cross-section of companies on the JSE 
allow for an exploration of the relationship betw
industry sectors (Section 3.3). Figure 8 represents the level of 
within the sample: 
 
The Basic Materials, Technology and Communications sector were noted as being below the 
average disclosure scores, with the lowe
sector, however this result is distorted as there was only one company i
(Section 3.3). The second lowest mean level of disclosure was noted in the Technology 
sector, followed closely by the Telecommunications sector, where the majority of the 
disclosures were in the Delegation of Responsibilities disclosure theme.
4.2.2, this category does not necessarily translate to an improved quality of 
 
The highest level of disclosure was in the Industrial sector, consisting mainly of companies 
with diversified lines of business. Due to thi
risk-disclosures will be larger. The extraction nature of the companies in the Basic Materials 
sector (predominantly mining companies) leads to an expectation of high overall disclosure 
scores as a result of their impact on the environment and 
these negative impacts (Carels 
Materials sector, however, 
increasing slightly to 40.5 in 2012. A possible reason for the fairly consiste
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Figure 5: Mean Risk Disclosure Scores per Sector
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n the sample 
risk-disclosure. 
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, 
nt risk-disclosure 
 scores over the period is the incorporation into the integrated reports of 
found previously within the separate sustainability reports which were already being issued 
by the majority of mining companies in this sample.
 
Figures 6 and 7 contain the average risk ratio (the number of times ‘risk’ is mentioned in the 
report over the total number of pages in the report) and the average 
page (average risk-disclosure 
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The sector analysis of the average ‘risk’ mentions per page reveals marked discrepancies in 
the trends between sectors.  In the Consumer Services sector, the ratio between the number 
of ‘risk’ mentions and the total number of pages has dropped significantly over the period 
under review from 1.18 to 0.75, whilst the average risk-disclosure score per page has 
remained relatively flat (0.25 in 2010 to 0.28 in 2013). This indicates that companies in the 
Consumer Services sector may have consolidated their risk-disclosure into concise sections 
of their reports, with 80% of the companies having a separate risk-disclosure section. This 
trend was also noted in the Industrials sector, where there was a pronounced increase in the 
average risk-disclosure score per page and a decrease in the number of ‘risk’ mentions. 
 
On the other hand, the ‘risk’ mention ratio has increased in the Technology sector with a 
corresponding increase in the risk-disclosure scores year-on-year, which could be an 
indicator of generic disclosures increasing. Although Spearman’s correlation coefficient 
(Table 5) indicates a relationship between risk-disclosure scores and the risk ratio, it seems 
that this relationship cannot be generalised across sectors. 
 
K means clustering 
As referred to in Section 3.4, a K-Means cluster analysis was performed, using a 
standardized version of the 201216 values. A four cluster solution was found and is 
interpreted below. The four clusters were characterised by making inter-cluster centroid 
value comparisons for each of the different frequency variables and also by comparing all 
centroid values to the overall mean frequency value. 
 
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics used for K means clustering 
  Unstandardised: Descriptive Statistics Unstandardised: Descriptive Statistics 
2012 Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviati
on Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Total number of pages in report 96 346 176.11 53.73 -1.52 1.92 0.00 0.91 
Number of times ‘risk’ is mentioned 51 371 193.84 78.32 -1.44 1.76 0.00 0.91 
Total risk-disclosure score 21 65 43.13 9.82 -2.25 2.23 0.00 1.00 
Report contains a separate risk 
section 0 1 0.77 0.43 -1.80 0.54 0.00 1.00 
Report contains a King-III disclosure 
checklist 0 1 0.31 0.47 -0.66 1.48 0.00 1.00 
 
 
Figure 8: represents the Mean Z scores per Cluster. 
                                                 
16 Consistent with the selection for Spearman’s rho, 2012 was selected as this is the most recent data in the 
sample and gives an indication of the latest risk-disclosure within the integrated reports of the companies in 
the sample. 
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Cluster 1: Long reports with average risk-disclosure 
These companies demonstrate, on average, the lowest risk-disclosure scores of the four 
groups. They tend not to have a King-III checklist but have slightly longer reports. The 
number of times that the word ‘risk’ is mentioned is above the average score for all 
companies under review. Cluster 1 companies tend to have a separate risk section. On 
average, they have more scores (60%) above (but not high above) the overall average than 
below. 
 
Cluster 2: Short reports with good risk-disclosure 
These companies demonstrate, on average that they have well below the average number 
of report pages and of ‘risk’ mentions compared to the sample as a whole. They generally do 
not have a King-III checklist but often include a separate risk section in their reports. The 
reports disclose substantially more of the risk-disclosures than the overall mean. On 
average, they have more scores (60%) above the overall average than below. 
 
Cluster 3: Long reports with excellent risk-disclosure 
These companies demonstrate, on average, that they have substantially more report pages 
and ‘risk’ mentions than the sample as a whole and they tend very strongly to have a King-III 
checklist while also tending towards having a separate risk section but to a lesser degree. 
They have also disclosed more of the risk-disclosures than the sample as a whole. On 
average, all their scores are above the overall average with more than half (60%) being very 
high. 
Total number of 
pages in report
Number of times 
"Risk" is mentioned
Total risk disclosure 
score
Report contains a 
separate risk section
Report contains a 
King III disclosure 
checklist
Cluster 1 0.146 0.151 -0.981 0.541 -0.658
Cluster 2 -0.526 -0.679 0.649 0.541 -0.658
Cluster 3 1.000 0.981 0.496 0.306 1.053
Cluster 4 -0.657 -0.470 -0.206 -1.282 0.292
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case that these smaller concerns have fewer resources and less expertise to prepare the 
same quality integrated reports as their larger counterparts.   
 
Telecommunications companies have 75% of their reports in Cluster 1, most with lengthy 
reports and average risk-disclosures. The Telecommunications sector in South Africa is an 
oligopoly with the market being protected from foreign competition due to recoupment of 
initial start-up costs being significant as well as regulatory protection (Theron and Boshoff, 
2006). The sector is also highly regulated, and like mining, tends to adopt a legalistic attitude 
to reporting. The non-competitive nature of the telecommunications sector may also result in 
less incentive to prepare innovative annual reports in order to attract investors.  
 
Cluster 2 represents 60% of the reports in the Consumer Services sector. Retail trade sales 
grew significantly in the period under analysis, driven mainly by the economic environment 
and retail centre development (Gauteng Province, 2012). Cluster 2 companies have the 
highest market capitalisation (Figure 15), with shorter reports and above average risk-
disclosure scores. This could be an indicator of the high level of competition in the services 
sector which forces better quality reports, and reports which are more integrated. This is in 
line with King-III and the IRC which state that good integrated reports can provide a 
competitive edge. The results are also consistent with the findings in the Mining Sector 
where high value industry leaders are preparing better quality integrated reports. As 
explained by the IRC (2011), King-III (IODSA, 2009) and Carels et al (2014), preparing such 
reports is an important means of signalling an organisation’s credibility and securing its 
position as a respected industry leader. Consequently, companies in the Consumer Services 
sector seem to be integrating risk-disclosure into their strategies and presenting a clear and 
concise report that encapsulates the vision of King-III and the IRC in terms of producing truly 
integrated reports.  
 
Cluster 3 companies have a relatively low market capitalisation (Figure 10) when compared 
to Cluster 1 and 2 but have lengthy reports with above average levels of risk-disclosure. 
These companies tend to fall into the Consumer Goods and Health Care industries, with 
relatively high risk ratios and risk-disclosure scores. This could signal their commitment to 
disclosing more with regard to their strategies and integration in an effort to attract 
shareholders and encourage growth. The majority of both Health Care and Consumer 
Goods companies tend to have foreign branches and subsidiaries, and this could be a 
contributing factor to the excellent level of risk-disclosure with risks differing from country to 
country, as well as the companies seeking foreign investment to grow their market 
capitalisation. 
  
Both Industrials and Technology have half of their companies falling into Cluster 4, with 
shorter reports with less than average 
disclosure checklists. Although these companies fall into the same 
note that the Technology Sector has seen an increase in the ‘risk’ mention ratios 
whilst the Industrial sector has a decrease in the same ratio. This 
quality of the disclosure in the reports 
therefore, not necessarily correlated with
Cluster 4 companies which performed worst wit
lowest market capital (Figure 10), in line with expectation.
 
Figure 10: Market Capitalisation per cluster
 
To summarise, there has been an overall increase
the majority of companies, and this increase is true for most disclosure themes identified. 
The risk ratio scores have, however, seen far smaller increases 
quality of the risk-disclosures. 
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throughout the reports of companies. The next section will 
of the results discussed above
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CHAPTER FIVE – CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Summary of findings  
 
The purpose of this study was to explore patterns and trends in risk-disclosure of South 
African firms with a primary listing on the JSE after the introduction of King-III in March 2010. 
The inability of organisations to anticipate and react to risk has been identified as one of the 
main reasons for corporate failures, increasing the importance of risk-management within 
corporate governance. Stakeholders are questioning the ability of the current reporting 
system to provide a comprehensive picture of an organisation’s performance and ability to 
create and sustain value, as financial information alone is not sufficient to understand how a 
company manages its risk (IRC, 2011; Rossouw, 2005; Ramsden, 2010; Abdo and Fisher, 
2007). The emergence of integrated reporting is, in part, a reaction to this. The integrated 
report is, in theory, an important tool in enhancing transparent communication to 
shareholders, which allows an understanding of the overall strategy of the organisation, 
together with how it is governed and how it will continue to add value into the future 
(Rensburg and Botha, 2013). 
 
Using the ‘Governance of Risk’ chapter in King-III, as well as a comprehensive literature 
review, a risk-disclosure matrix was compiled. Data was collected from a sample of 3917 
companies using a risk-disclosure matrix and were analysed using a detailed content 
analysis supported by limited statistical and interpretative text analysis. The risk-disclosure 
scores were analysed to identify key themes and patterns across years, companies and 
sectors. 
 
A number of key themes emerged during the analysis of the integrated reports year-on-year. 
Firstly, there was a general increase in the risk-disclosure scores in the majority of the 
integrated reports, with the average of the risk-disclosure scores increasing by 22% from 
2010 to 2012. An increase in the integration of risks in specific integrated reports in the 
sample was also noted, with certain companies having a significant amount of well 
structured information regarding risk, across all of the disclosure themes identified. This 
suggests that the introduction of King-III, in 2009, and the focus on risk by the IRC 
(2009/2010), has led to an increase in risk-disclosures from 2010 to 2011.  
                                                 
17 During testing it was noted that one of the companies in the sample selected based on market capitalisation 
on 31 March 2013 did not have three consecutive annual reports due to a merger in 2011 and was excluded 
from the analysis, leaving 38 companies in the sample tested. 
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 It is important to note, however, that the risk-disclosure scores measure the quantum, rather 
than the quality, of the disclosure in the reports reviewed. Repetition of risks in a number of 
different sections contributed to the increase in the number of times ‘risk’ was mentioned 
(from 179.55 in 2010 to 193.84 in 2012). This generic risk-management disclosure results in 
annual reports with a high disclosure score but which are not fully aligned with the principle 
of providing integrated decision-useful information to users of the reports.  Of all companies 
under review, including those with above average scores, there was at least some degree of 
repetition. In several instances, generic risk-management disclosures were repeated 
verbatim year-on-year. These generic risk-management disclosures do little to enhance the 
usefulness of the integrated report for decision making for stakeholders (Solomon and 
Maroun, 2012; Carels et al, 2014). Likewise, the provision of only generic and 
unsubstantiated information is not consistent with the need for high quality integrated 
reporting (IRC, 2011).  
 
The increase in the average risk ratio without a corresponding increase in the average risk-
disclosure ratio indicates that companies are not providing more valuable and quality 
disclosures but are merely increasing the volume of repetitive information. Although there 
has been an increase in the extent of risk-related disclosure, this has gone hand-in-hand 
with an increase in the length of the reports. The result is that the average quantity of risk 
information per section of the report has remained relatively unchanged from 2010 to 2012, 
which is contrary to the vision of King-III and the IRC, including the integration of 
sustainability into day-to-day business strategy and operations (E&Y, 2011b; E&Y, 2009; 
IRC, 2011). Further, the total number of pages in the report was found not to correlate to any 
of the disclosure themes or to the overall risk-disclosure score, whilst a high correlation was 
noted between the total number of pages in the report and the number of times ‘risk’ is 
mentioned, supporting the argument that the length of the report does not seem to have an 
effect on the quality of the risk-disclosures. In addition, companies with King-III disclosure 
checklists tend to have higher disclosure scores, also not necessarily resulting in more valid 
reporting.  
 
An analysis of the trends within the disclosure themes revealed that, while there was a 
general increase within each disclosure theme, there was at least one company that chose 
not to include any of the disclosures in each disclosure theme. This indicates (but does not 
prove) that the IRC and introduction of King-III did not have the consistent effect of 
increasing quality disclosures, and raises concerns as to whether companies are complying 
with disclosures required without giving due consideration to the value that the disclosures 
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can add. Although both the classification between ‘recommended’ and ‘to be disclosed’ both 
increased year-on-year, companies do not appear to view this classification as significant 
when deciding what risk-disclosure should be included. This affirms the view that companies 
are applying King-III as a disclosure checklist, providing only the information that they feel 
obligated to disclose. 
 
The sector and K-cluster analysis provided complementary insights, with the Basic Materials, 
Technology and Communications sectors having below average disclosure scores. The 
highest level of disclosure was in the Industrial sector, consisting mainly of companies with 
diversified lines of business. These findings suggest that factors influencing both length of 
reports, and their risk-disclosure score, could be sector specific such as the level of 
regulation; level of competition; economic growth and market capitalisation (as a proxy for 
company size).  
  
Overall, these results suggest that the first set of integrated reports has not achieved the 
objective of providing high quality, succinct information to stakeholders. . Evidence gathered 
in this study indicates that there has been an increase in the quantum of risk-disclosure but 
there has not necessarily been an increase in the quality of the disclosures given the 
excessive repetition of disclosures and the increase in the number of ‘risk mentions’ without 
a corresponding increase in risk disclosure scores. There is an increased awareness of the 
importance of complementing traditional financial reporting with a more comprehensive 
review of organisations’ key risks and their sustainability in the short-, medium- and long-
term. In some cases, however, the added risk-disclosure comes with repetition, the inclusion 
of generic risk information, and a lack of integration between risk-based disclosures and 
other key financial and non-financial metrics. For companies relying on the use of disclosure 
checklists to prepare their reports, there appears to be an elevated risk of integrated 
reporting being applied in a procedural fashion, contrary to the recommendations of the IIRC 
and King-III. 
 
5.2 Limitations and areas for future research  
 
There are a number of recommendations for future research on risk-related disclosures. As 
this study has a South Africa-specific focus, risk-disclosure trends in other jurisdictions were 
not considered and can be considered for future research. A further recommendation for 
future research may be the extension of the sample, both in quantity and over a longer 
period of time to enable a complete and accurate assessment of not only the quantity but 
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also the quality of risk-disclosures. A further contribution to the current research would be a 
review of the effect of specific events on risk-disclosures, for example, Marikana.  
 
In addition, the extension of the sample within specific industries could future explore risk-
related disclosures. For example, the sample excluded financial service companies as they 
are subject to very specific risk-disclosure. mandated by various regulations such as Basel 
III and IFRS 7 – when analysed, these reports may offer some insights into risk-disclosure in 
financial services companies. 
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APPENDIX A
Possible Disclosure
Type of Disclosure 
(To be disclosed / 
Recommended) Literature Review Themes Reference Keyword
OVERALL RISK-DISCLOSURES
1 Board develop and implement policy and plan for systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve effectiveness of risk-management Recommended Responsibility of Board to approve a risk policy and management plan that is appropriate (annually/continually) E&Y1, 2010; KPMG2, 2009; KPMG3, Systematic, Disciplined
2 The Board should be responsible for the governance of risk Recommended Board disclose their responsibility for risk (govern risk within the organisation)
E&Y4, 2009; E&Y1, 2010; KPMG2, 
2009; KPMG3, 2012 Risk Governance
3 The Board should also disclose its views on the effectiveness of the company‘s risk-management processes in the integrated report. To be disclosed Required disclosure: Board should disclose their views on the risk-management process effectiveness
E&Y4, 2009; Coetsee et. al, 2011; 
E&Y6, 2011; KPMG2, 2009; KPMG3, Effectiveness Risk-Management
4 Board disclose how it has satisfied itself that risk assessments, responses and interventions are effective Recommended The Board should be able to demonstrate that it has dealt with governance of risk comprehensively KPMG3, 2012 Interventions
5 Board should ensure organisational structures and resources provide for appropriate execution of risk-management processes. Recommended Organisational Structures
6 Board should provide management with other necessary support to enable execution of duties and responsibilities outlined in the risk policy and plan Recommended Execution of risk
7 Management reports should disclose processes in place to improve risk-management maturity of the company Recommended Risk Maturity
8 Management reports should include the degree to which risk-management has been embedded throughout the company Recommended Embedding of risk
DELEGATION OF RISK RESPONSIBILITIES
9 Board scope of responsibility expressed in Charter, as well as induction and training processes. Recommended The responsibility for governing risk should be specified within the Board charter KPMG2, 2009 Charter
10 Risk committee or audit committee may be appointed to assist Board with duties and responsibilities with regard to risk governance Recommended A Risk Committee can be formed with defined responsibilities, or the Audit Committee E&Y1, 2010; E&Y5, 2009; KPMG3, Risk Committee
11 If the Board delegates this responsibility to another commitee, the terms of reference for this committee should reflect this responsibility. Recommended The execution of the risk-management function can be delegated to management E&Y1, 2010; E&Y5, 2009 Terms of reference
12 If the Board delegates this responsibility to another commitee, the Board should approve the terms of reference containing the responsibility Recommended Approval of Terms of reference
13 Sub Committee membership should include both executives and non-executives. Recommended Committee composition
14 Members of senior management responsible for the various areas of risk-management should attend risk meetings Recommended Senior management
15 Sub Committee should have adequate risk-management skills and experience to perform functions Recommended
Risk Committee should have a minimum of three members and can consist of executive and non-executive directors, as well as senior 
management and independent risk experts KPMG3, 2012 Risk-management skill
16 Independent risk-management experts can be invited to attend sub committee meetings Recommended Independent risk expert
17 Risk Committee should have a minimum of three members. Recommended
Risk Committee should have a minimum of three members and can consist of executive and non-executive directors, as well as senior 
management and independent risk experts KPMG3, 2012 Risk Committee
18 Risk Committee should meet at least twice per year and individuals reporting to the committee should provide with sufficient information to discharge responsibility Recommended
Risk Committee should have a minimum of three members and can consist of executive and non-executive directors, as well as senior 
management and independent risk experts KPMG3, 2012 Risk Committee
19 Board evaluate risk committee performance in terms of composition, mandate and effectiveness Recommended The Board is responsible for evaluating the performance of this committee KPMG3, 2012 Risk Committee
20 CEO may appoint a Chief Risk Officer to assist with execution of risk-management Recommended A Chief Risk Officer (CRO) can be appointed to embed risk-management in the day to day tasks E&Y1, 2010 Chief Risk Officer
21
CRO should be suitably experienced person who should have access to, and interact regularly on, strategic risk matters with Board and appropriate Board committees and executive 
management. Recommended Chief Risk Officer
22 Internal audit function should provide independent assurance in relation to risk-management regarding the integrity and robustness of the risk-management process. Recommended
King III suggests that Internal audit should follow a risk based approach, and the internal audit planning should include an assessment of risks and 
opportunities facing the organisation, aligning with the risk assessment process whilst considering the risk maturity of the organisation itself PWC, 2009 Internal Audit
23 Internal audit should provide a written assessment of the effectiveness of the system of internal controls and risk-management to the Board Recommended The Internal Audit function evaluates the efficiency of the Audit Committee as well as the risk-management policies and processes. E&Y3, 2011 Internal Audit
24 CEO is accountable to the Board for the execution of risk-management Recommended Execution of risk
RISK TOLERANCE LEVELS
25 At least once a year, Board should set specific limits for levels of risk company able to tolerate in pursuit of objectives Recommended Risk Tolerance
26 Board should review these limits during periods of increased uncertainty or adverse changes in business environment Recommended Changes in business environment
27 When setting risk tolerance levels, Board should consider risk factors in both external and internal business environments Recommended Changes in business environment
28 Risk tolerance levels can be measured quantitatively, qualitatively or both. Recommended Risk Tolerance
29 Risk tolerance levels should be specific to each of the relevant business activities. Recommended Risk Tolerance
30 Risk tolerance levels should be used to set parameters for development of business strategy Recommended
Board should identify the organisation’s strategic objectives and map these strategies as they are intended to be used as each strategy will 
expose the organisation to a different type of risk KPMG3, 2012 Risk Tolerance
31 Limits regarding company's risk appetite, and disclosure where risk appetite exceeds or deviates materially from limits of risk tolerance. To be disclosed Required disclosure: Board disclose that they have set limits for risk appetite and tolerance 
E&Y4, 2009; E&Y1, 2010; E&Y3, 
2011; E&Y5, 2009 Risk appetite
32 Specific limits/levels should be set and implemented at departmental or functional, activity and operational levels risk levels. Recommended Departmental level
33 Board should satisfy itself that management decisions balance performance within defined tolerance limits Recommended Tolerance limit
RISK-MANAGEMENT POLICY AND PLAN
34 The Board's responsibility for risk governance should be a documented risk-management policy and plan Recommended Formal risk-management
35 The Board's risk strategy should be executed by management in accordance with the Board approved risk-management policy and plan. Recommended
Disclose per key material issues (economic, environmental and social) the strategy, implementation and initiatives as well as management 
approach E&Y6, 2011 Strategy
36 Management should develop a formal risk-management policy and plan for approval by Board. Recommended Formal risk-management
37 Management is accountable to the Board for the design, implementation and monitoring the system and process of risk-management. Recommended
The responsibility delegated includes the design, implementation and monitoring of the risk-management plans in order to give the Board 
assurance of the effectiveness of this risk-management process 
E&Y5, 2009; KPMG2, 2009; KPMG3, 
2012 Accountable for risk
38
The risk-management policy should include definitions of risk and risk-management, the risk-management objectives, the risk approach and philosophy as well as various 
responsibilities and ownership for risk-management within the company Recommended risk-management policy
29 Formal risk-management policy distributed throughout company Recommended The Board is responsible for ensuring that the policy is widely distributed. KPMG2, 2009 risk-management policy
40
Management should demonstrate to the Board that the risk-management plan provides for the identification and exploitation of opportunities to improve the performance of the 
company Recommended Identification opportunities
41 Management should give effect to risk-management in operations in substance and form Recommended Substance and form
42 Risk-management should be embedded within strategy setting, planning and business processes to safeguard performance and sustainability. Recommended Embedding of risk
43 Risk-management should provide responses and interventions that strive to create an appropriate balance between risk and reward within the company. Recommended Balance between risk and reward
44 Risk-management plan consider maturity of risk-management Recommended The risk-management plan should aim to bring the organisation to its desired level of risk maturity KPMG3, 2012; Coetsee et. al, 2011 Risk Maturity
45 Risk-management plan should include company‘s risk-management structure Recommended risk-management plan
46 Risk-management plan include risk-management framework i.e. the approach followed, for instance, COSO, ISO, IRMSA ERM Code of Practice, IRM (UK), etc Recommended A risk and control framework should be developed against which risk assessments can be conducted E&Y3, 2011 risk-management plan
47 Risk-management plan should include standards and methodology adopted – this refers to the measureable milestones such as tolerances, intervals, frequencies, frequency rates, Recommended Disclose accounting policies and reporting standards used for measurement of sustainability issues E&Y6, 2011 risk-management plan
48 Risk-management plan should include risk-management guidelines Recommended risk-management plan
49 Risk-management plan should include reference to integration through, for instance, training and awareness programmes; and Recommended risk-management plan
50 Risk-management plan should include details of the assurance and review of the risk-management process. Recommended risk-management plan
51 To enable the exploitation of the upside of risks (opportunities), the risk-management plan should not concentrate only on de-risking responses and interventions Recommended Exploit opportunities
MONITORING OF RISK-MANAGEMENT Recommended Exploit upside risk
52 Board should review risk-management plan regularly but at least once a year Recommended Risk Register
53 Board should ensure management monitors risk-management plan effectively and continually. Recommended Monitoring should occur as frequently as required by the risk itself and reported to Board along with the metrics that have exceeded the baseline IODSA, 2010 Monitor risk
54 Board should satisfy itself that management has applied the risk-management processes appropriately and that they are compliant to the policy and procedures Recommended Compliance with risk policy
55 The risk-management plan should clearly identify responsibilities for monitoring risks. Recommended Responsibilities
56 Risk-management performance should be measured against risk indicators by management Recommended Risk Indicators
57 Risk indicators should be periodically reviewed for appropriateness by management Recommended
Risk indicators should be identified and monitored for significant changes/events that occur that effect the risk profile and the environment in 
which the organisation operates E&Y3, 2011 Risk Indicators
58 Deviation from the risk-management plan should be periodically measured Recommended Deviation risk-management
59 Changes in the external and internal environment should be monitored by management Recommended Changes in business environment
60 The impact of environmental changes on the strategic risk profile of the company should be determined by management Recommended Management consider and implement appropriate risk responses and continually monitor risk E&Y5, 2009 Environmental changes
61 Management should ensure that risk responses are effective and efficient in both design and operation Recommended Management consider and implement appropriate risk responses and continually monitor risk E&Y5, 2009 Effectiveness risk-management
62 Implementation of risk responses should be tracked by management Recommended Implementation
63 Lessons from changes, trends, successes, failures and events should be analysed by management to ensure they are carried forward. Recommended Lessons carried forward
64 Emerging risks should be identified by management Recommended Emerging risks
65 Management is accountable to the Board to assure that the risk-management plan is integrated in the day-to-day activities of the company Recommended Day-to-day activities
66
Significant risk response failings or weaknesses should be disclosed in management's reports to the Board, including the impact that they may have had and the resultant corrective 
responses and interventions Recommended Significant risk response failing
67 Board should satisify itself that insurance, indemnification and remuneration practices do not prejudice risk-management decision-making Recommended Insurance, indemnification
KEY RISKS
68 Board continually monitor significant risk taken by management Recommended Significant risk
69 Board should regularly receive and review register of company's key risks. Recommended The Board is responsible to review of the company’s risk register with risks quantified where possible KPMG2, 2009 Risk Register
70 Risk information presented to the Board should include a profile of aggregated risks, correlated risks and risk concentrations. Recommended Risk profile
71 Board should ensure particular attention focused on those risks that may negatively impact the long-term sustainability of the company. Recommended
Disclose current, imminent and envisaged risks that threaten company’s long term sustainability, internal control system and risk-management 
processes E&Y6, 2011 Sustainability risk
72 Board should regularly receive and review a risk register on the company‘s sustainability risks To be disclosed A description of the principal risks and uncertainties facing the company should be disclosed Deloitte and Touche, 2008; E&Y6, Sustainability risk
73 Integrated report should include key sustainability risks, responses to these risks and residual responsibility risks. To be disclosed Required disclosure: Board should disclose key sustainability risks, responses and the residual sustainability risks in terms of their risk assessment E&Y4, 2009; KPMG3, 2012 Sustainability risk
74 Board should ensure that the key risks are quantified where practicable. Recommended The Board is responsible to review of the company’s risk register with risks quantified where possible KPMG2, 2009 Quantification of risk
75 Frameworks and processes should be in place that help to anticipate unpredictable risks. Recommended Unpredictable risk
76 Responses to identified risks should be noted in the risk register Recommended Risk Register
Required Disclosue: disclose details on any undue, unexpected, and unusual risks have been taken in pursuit of reward, as well as any materials E&Y4, 2009; E&Y6, 2011; PWC, 2009; 
77 In statement Integrated report for the period under review, disclose undue, unexpected or unusual risks in pursuit of reward To be disclosed losses and the causes of these losses KPMG2, 2009; KPMG3, 2012 Undue, unexpected, unusual risk
78 In statement Integrated report for the period under review, disclose material losses and causes of losses To be disclosed
Required Disclosue: disclose details on any undue, unexpected, and unusual risks have been taken in pursuit of reward, as well as any materials 
losses and the causes of these losses
E&Y4, 2009; E&Y6, 2011; PWC, 2009; 
KPMG2, 2009; KPMG3, 2012 Material losses
79
In statement Integrated report for the period under review, disclose material losses quantification, impact on company, responses and interventions implemented as well as 
prevention of recurrence by management To be disclosed
Required disclosure: Board should disclose material losses and causes need to be disclosed, including quantification and impact of the risks as well 
as responses and interventions that were implemented in order to prevent the reoccurrence.
E&Y4, 2009; E&Y6, 2011; KPMG3, 
2012 Material losses quantification
80 The Board should disclose any current, imminent or envisaged risk that may threaten the long-term sustainability of the company. To be disclosed Imminenet risk
81 Board should ensure it understands the implications of risks taken by management in pursuit of returns Recommended Balance between risk and reward
82 Board should ensure it understands the potential impact of risk-taking on shareholders and stakeholders Recommended Potential impact of risk taking
83 Reports from management to Board should provide a balanced assessment of key risks facing the company and the effectiveness of the risk responses and interventions Recommended Balanced assessment
RISK ASSESSMENTS
84 Board should ensure there is an effective ongoing risk assessment process Recommended Risk Assessment
85 A systematic, documented, formal risk assessment should be conducted once a year. Recommended Formal risk assessment including continuous monitoring of the entity’s risk profile rather than a once off annual assessment.
E&Y3, 2011; KPMG1, 2011; KPMG2, 
2009 Risk Assessment
86 The risk assessment should be continually reviewed, updated and applied. Recommended The Board is responsible for ensuring that risk assessments are carried out on a continual basis E&Y5, 2009; KPMG2, 2009 Risk Assessment
87 Ongoing risk assessment process should include risk identification Recommended Risk Assessment
88 Ongoing risk assessment process should include risk quantification Recommended Risk Assessment
89 Ongoing risk assessment process should include risk evaluation Recommended Risk Assessment
90 Following the risk evaluation process, risks should be prioritised and ranked to focus responses and interventions on risks outside of Board's tolerance limits. Recommended Prioritisation of risk
91 The risk assessment process should identify risks and opportunities and measure their potential impact and likelihood. Recommended
Each risk should be aligned with its impact and likelihood ratings to determine how significant the risk is and whether the organisation is able to 
accept the risk E&Y3, 2011 Impact and likelihood
92 The outputs of the risk assessments should provide the Board and management with a realistic perspective of key risks and other material risks that the company faces. Recommended Realistic
93 Risk assessment should be comprehensive, accurate, thorough and complete. Recommended Comprehensive and accurate
94 Risk assessment should include the use of data analysis, business indicators, market information, loss data, scenario planning and portfolio analysis Recommended Data analysis
95 Risk assessment should not be limited to a fixed list of risk categories Recommended No fixed list
96 Risk assessment process should impact all operational levels Recommended Operational levels
ADDITIONAL FROM LITERATURE REVIEW
97 Processes are in place that allow the complete, timely, accurate and accessible risk-disclosures to stakeholders Recommended Processes are in place that allow the complete, timely, accurate and accessible risk-disclosures to stakeholders E&Y5, 2009 Risk-disclosures
98 Disclose actual performance with regard to each issue and risk identified Recommended Disclose actual performance with regard to each issue and risk identified IODSA, 2010 Actual performance of each risk
99 Disclose with regard to each issue and risk identified the target set, baseline, prior year performance and benchmarking against peers, industry norms or national averages Recommended
Disclose with regard to each issue and risk identified the target set, baseline, prior year performance and benchmarking against peers, industry 
norms or national averages IODSA, 2010 Baseline of risk
100 Disclose per key material issues the risks and opportunities, material financial and non-financial indicators, a high level narrative description of the performance and objectives Recommended
Disclose per key material issues the risks and opportunities, material financial and non-financial indicators, a high level narrative description of 
the performance and objectives E&Y6, 2011 Narration of risk
101 Disclose per key material issue the targets for current and future years Recommended Disclose per key material issue the targets for current and future years E&Y6, 2011 Targets for risk (future)
102 Disclose how sustainability issues are identified by the company Recommended Disclose how sustainability issues are identified by the company E&Y6, 2011 Sustainability risk
103 Disclose the programmes put in place and energy management plans  in terms of sustainability issues Recommended Disclose the programmes put in place and energy management plans  in terms of sustainability issues E&Y6, 2011 Sustainability risk
104 Disclose a prior year comparison to current year sustainability targets Recommended Disclose a prior year comparison to current year sustainability targets E&Y6, 2011 Sustainability risk
105 Disclose any forward looking information and plans to reach sustainability targets Recommended Disclose any forward looking information and plans to reach sustainability targets E&Y6, 2011 Sustainability risk
106 Disclosure of the broad positive and negative aspects of the company’s performance in terms of ethics, economic, social and environmental aspects Recommended
Disclosure of the broad positive and negative aspects of the company’s performance in terms of ethics, economic, social and environmental 
aspects E&Y6, 2011 Positive and Negative aspects
107
Contextualise the financial results by reporting on the positive or negative impact that the company has had on stakeholders and the effectiveness of internal controls and risk-
management process Recommended
Contextualise the financial results by reporting on the positive or negative impact that the company has had on stakeholders and the 
effectiveness of internal controls and risk-management process E&Y6, 2011 Positive and Negative aspects
108
Audit committee responsible to monitor the combined assurance framework in order to ensure that all key risks are addressed adequately, and requires reporting annually to this 
affect Recommended
Audit committee responsible to monitor the combined assurance framework in order to ensure that all key risks are addressed adequately, and 
requires reporting annually to this affect PWC, 2009; KPMG3, 2012 Combined Assurance Framework
109 Separate risk-disclosure section Recommended Separate risk-disclosure section E&Y6, 2011 Separate risk-disclosure section
